

Book reviews

International Relations theory

Hegemony in international society. By Ian Clark. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2011. 277pp. Index. £30.00. ISBN 978 0 19955 626 7.

Ian Clark has done more than any other contemporary scholar to extend our understanding of the history of modern international society and its basic principles. His *Reform and resistance in the international order* (Cambridge University Press, 1980) explored the various means by which order was created and maintained from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the Cold War. *The post-Cold War order* (Oxford University Press, 2001) brought this story up to date—and provided what is still the best general account of the distributive and regulative arrangements agreed by international society after the collapse of the Soviet Union. His two subsequent books on legitimacy (*International legitimacy and world society*, Oxford University Press, 2007; *Legitimacy in international society*, OUP, 2005) directed attention to the normative bonds that hold together international society and the challenges to those norms that come from ‘world society’, from activist individuals and groups.

Hegemony in international society both builds upon and challenges this earlier body of work. Clark is well aware that most English School writers have taken hegemony to be antithetical to order and society in international relations. For them, hegemony implied a threat to the independence of states that would, in time, generate a counter-hegemonic coalition. In contrast, he asks whether hegemony could be both legitimate and lasting.

Clark starts by asserting that ‘hegemony’ should not be treated as another word for military or economic preponderance. Instead, he insists that it must be defined narrowly, as an ‘institutionalized practice of special rights and responsibilities, conferred by international society or a constituency within it, on a state (or states) with the resources to lead’ (p. 4). Hegemony is best considered, in other words, as an ‘institution’ of international society, in which the hegemon is recognized as such by other actors and hegemony may theoretically be transferred from one hegemon to another. Clark also sketches four ideal types of hegemony: singular and coalitional, or singular and inclusive, in which one state leads either with ad hoc partners or with a broader-ranging constituency; and collective and coalitional, or collective and inclusive, where a group of states take the lead. These heuristic devices are designed to help identify past, present and future hegemonies, and to understand how and why they operate. Clark posits that collective and inclusive hegemonies are likely to attain higher levels of legitimacy than the other forms, but does not rule out the possibility of another form working, at least for a time.

In the core of the book, Clark examines three cases of historical hegemonies or apparent hegemonies—the Concert of Europe, nineteenth-century Great Britain and the postwar United States—and discusses the possibility and implications of American hegemony in three dimensions of contemporary international society. He finds the Concert’s collective

hegemony unstable, the historical case for British singular inclusive hegemony unconvincing, and America's singular coalitional hegemony doomed to fail. He calls for US-led reform of the United Nations to bolster collective hegemony in international security, a multilayered order in East Asia to cope with the rise of China, and a hybrid singular-collective approach on climate change.

This is a rich, nuanced book that ranges more widely than most, making summary difficult. Clark aims to add historical and theoretical sophistication to hegemony, and he achieves this with aplomb. The book might, perhaps, have said a bit more about how hegemony is affirmed—about the processes by which legitimacy is conferred on the hegemon—to ward off any reassertion of the Realist argument that hegemony is really just window-dressing for primacy.

Making hegemony an 'institution' does not necessarily save it from that fate. Who makes these 'institutions', where do they come from and whose purposes do they serve? Like the balance of power, diplomacy, Great Powers, international law and the particular form of war favoured by the English School, 'hegemony' is the product of western ideas and practices, albeit shaped by encounters—sometimes even by negotiations—with the non-western world. Is it enough to assume that they are legitimate because they have persisted to today? Or is it the case that these institutions will likely be eroded—as Hedley Bull thought they had already been—by the rise of the non-western world? Many thinkers and practitioners in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa suggest we are already in transition to a multipolar order where the rules of international society—and the primary institutions—could well be very different from what we have inherited from the West. If that happens—this reader's qualms notwithstanding—Clark's book will still stand as a fitting tribute to an idea whose time has passed.

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The problem of harm in world politics: theoretical investigations. By **Andrew Linklater**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2011. 306pp. £17.99. ISBN 978 0 52117 984 3.

On 11 September 2001, over 3,000 people were killed in a terrorist attack in the United States. This resulted in two wars, further terrorist attacks and counterterrorism responses. Not only have these military and terrorist actions produced hundreds of thousands of deaths, the world has seen targeted killings and public executions by both state and non-state actors.

Andrew Linklater's new book, *The problem of harm in world politics*, in which he explores how conventions against harm have emerged and been part of larger civilizing processes, might be dismissed in light of these events. Yet it is worth noting that most people consider the large-scale, public deaths that resulted from 9/11—both by non-state and state actors—to be horrific and uncivilized. Compare this moral revulsion, which stretches across the globe, to the mass deaths that took place in ancient and medieval times, often with sanction from religious authorities. While people are still being killed for political purposes, every day it becomes more difficult to justify those killings in the name of a religious tradition or political ideology.

It is exactly such moral and political shifts in perspective that Linklater's book encourages us to understand. In the first volume of a planned long-term project, Linklater examines the idea of harm in the context of global politics. He draws on the social theorist

Norbert Elias to examine whether or not the creation of harm conventions is linked to processes of civilization. Not content to rely solely on Elias's account, Linklater draws into his analysis insights derived from the English School of International Relations (IR) theory, which enables him to map conventions against harm onto the process of state systems and societies. His use of theorists from moral philosophy, criminology and historical sociology demonstrates why he is considered to be one of the leading lights in not only IR theory but international political theory as well. Indeed, this book demonstrates why Linklater cannot be described as an IR critical theorist, which much of his earlier work suggests; here, he is simultaneously a liberal, critical theorist, post-structuralist and English School theorist. Linklater's 'critical process sociology' is an effort to draw these theoretical strands together. His range in both theoretical understanding and historical breadth is difficult to compare to other theorists working in IR or political theory today.

Linklater argues that he is not providing a theory of harm but is 'theorizing' harm instead. The distinction suggests that the reader will not be handed a definition of harm and an explanation for why conventions arise in response to practices of harm. Instead, and more importantly, Linklater demonstrates how practices of harm and conventions to stop such practices relate to wider political and ethical systems. Because of this wide-ranging agenda, there is no way to summarize the conclusions in a book review. One can see, though, how Linklater is locating his discussion of harm conventions within a broader conception of cosmopolitan theory, though a theory seasoned by his use of critical theory, process sociology and English School categories. He concludes this text with a series of questions, which he suggests will form the outline of a new 'empirical' research agenda, one designed to understand not only harm conventions, but more importantly, processes of civilization.

With a book this grand in scale, suggestions for what has been left out or what might be worth considering can come across as churlish. In fact, the benefit of this book is that it does open us to the larger questions of history, sociology and international politics. In light of this, I would suggest three further 'big' questions: first, the concept of harm and efforts to prevent harm and pain seem linked to the fear of death. It is not simply that we do not like harm, but harm to the body ultimately leads to death. In chapter two, Linklater discusses the secularization of pain, which might provide an entry into the social dimensions of death. Another point of departure for such a consideration might be Hans Morgenthau's articles about death and the nuclear age, written towards the end of his career. Second, while Linklater, via Elias, takes the civilization idea outside a triumphalist 'West versus the rest' discourse, he might benefit from exploring some of the work of post-colonial theory. These works address similar themes, but they seek to develop how the practices of colonialism have shaped the contours of modern politics. The English School, which Linklater has helped to turn into a more normative tradition, could benefit from more engagement with this scholarship. Third, Linklater's use of the English School perhaps limits his ability to formulate ideas of harm in relation to transnational threats such as terrorism. For instance, the UN Security Council response to 9/11, in which it effectively legislated against financing terrorist organizations, was both an advance in creating greater harm conventions, but also a problematic assertion of power by an institution that was not set up to make global law. Considering these faltering responses in more concrete terms is undoubtedly part of the long-term project, but the theoretical tensions of transnational threats might have been addressed in this initial volume.

Overall, though, this book is to be welcomed. It reaffirms Linklater's reputation as one of the leading social and political theorists working in the world today. We know that

violence will continue, but Linklater gives us some resources for understanding how efforts to prevent such harms will intersect with larger dynamics in international politics.

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The invention of International Relations theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 conference on theory. Edited by Nicolas Guilhot. New York: Columbia University Press. 2011. 299pp. Index. Pb.: £20.50. ISBN 978 0 23115 267 9.

Contrary to received wisdom, as this book shows, the intellectual enterprise of International Relations (IR) theory is only a little over half a century old. It is the product of a very particular age—the 1950s—and part of a wider effort to come to terms with a new world forged by three decades of war. In different places, theorizing took different forms. In Britain, it became a historical exercise of recovering lost ‘traditions’ of international thought. In America, by contrast, doing theory meant building something new, even if the materials were ages old.

This book takes us back to one of the points of origin of international theory, to the Rockefeller-sponsored conference on international politics held in early May 1954, which brought together many of the leading thinkers and practitioners of the age, including W. T. R. Fox, Walter Lippmann, Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk and Arnold Wolfers. The book reprints the papers presented and provides the transcript of the discussions, but most of it is taken up with a series of commentaries from Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder, Brian C. Schmidt, Ole Wæver, Nicolas Guilhot, Anders Stephanson, Inderjeet Parmar and Philip Mirowski.

While the conference proceedings can only be described as bland, the politics of the meeting and its context were anything but dull. Two quite different agendas were tabled, but never reconciled. The practitioners pushed for a body of theory that had the philosophical depth to help shape America’s long-term strategy and at the same time give it tools to deal with everyday challenges. For Nitze, this implied an account of what he called the ‘ontological and moral order’ as well as technical studies of decision-making processes (p. 279). The scholars, led by Morgenthau and given tacit backing by Thompson, his former student and Rockefeller staffer, wanted to pursue other things—a kind of higher political wisdom, for Morgenthau himself, or a higher political morality, for Niebuhr. They wished to nurture ‘statesmen’ and ‘speak truth to power’, not be their servants.

These disagreements helped ensure that the Rockefeller committee did not coalesce into a longer-running enterprise, like its clubby British equivalent which persisted from the late 1950s until the early 1980s. But the meeting was nonetheless significant, even if the commentators in this volume disagree on exactly how. Parmar, for example, takes the conventional European line that Realism was generated to inform and underpin ‘American hegemony’ in the postwar era. Guilhot takes a different view. IR theory, he argues, was invented by the Realists for two principal reasons. Yes, the Realists wished to shape policy-making, but they were also engaged in another struggle within the academy against the behaviouralists. Inventing international theory was an attempt to safeguard the autonomy of the field against the totalizing intellectual claims of behaviouralism, which asserted all social science could be unified by method.

Guilhot argues that this ‘Realist gambit’ failed. He has a point. Exactly what influence the Realists had on policy-making in America remains a matter of debate, but—as Mirowski points out—the kind of anti-liberal ‘reactionary modernism’ that classical Realism embodied hardly sits well with the dominant modes of American political thought,

then as now. Exactly how successful the Realists were in preserving 'IR', to use Waever's words, 'as a distinct discipline' is also contestable, especially in the United States, where it remains a subfield of political science, conducted—for the most part—with exactly the kinds of methods the Realists deplored.

In sum, this is an intriguing book about an important, if slightly baffling, episode in the intellectual history of International Relations, not least because it raises as many questions as it answers.

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International law, human rights and ethics

The last utopia: human rights in history. By Samuel Moyn. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. 2010. 337pp. Index. £20.95. ISBN 978 0 67404 872 0.

In this illuminating, thoughtful and well-researched book, Samuel Moyn seeks to reappraise the origins and history of the 'human rights' which have become a central part of international political and legal discourse.

Moyn's central thesis is that the origins of today's human rights movement, which he identifies as a 'utopian program' (p. 5) transcending national boundaries, are recent. They are not to be found in classical Greek thought, in the revelations and revolutions of the Enlightenment period, in the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the wave of decolonization of the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, Moyn argues that the human rights movement of today only came into being in the 1970s, as a result of the failure, perceived or real, of other utopias. With the exception of chapter five, on the development of international law in relation to human rights (which is clearly not the work's focus), the book proceeds in a largely chronological fashion.

In chapter one, Moyn conducts a brief canter through 2,500 years of what he identifies as the 'precursors' of human rights. Moyn identifies the earliest origins of 'rights' talk in Greek and Roman philosophy, moves on to medieval (and later) natural law theories, before discussing in more detail the rights asserted in the political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe and America. Moyn's argument is that a search for the origins of today's utopian programme in these revolutions is misplaced. As the rights asserted in those revolutions were central to the construction of the state, and to setting its boundaries, those rights—and that history—cannot be seen as the basis of today's human rights movement, which seeks to transcend it. However, while convincing in the context of his search for the roots of the development of human rights as a utopian programme, the position taken perhaps neglects an alternative (and arguably more central) role for human rights. The rights (and the remedies for those rights) on which individuals rely for redress against government action often have as their basis precisely those constitutional instruments which have their roots in precisely those national revolutions.

Chapters two and three are perhaps the strongest chapters of the book. In chapter two, through a thorough review of the primary and secondary source material, Moyn demonstrates that, far from constituting the dawn of a new era, the now-totemic UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a damp squib. Born almost inadvertently into a world rapidly descending into the Cold War, human rights were for most of this time of marginal relevance, merely a sideshow to the debate between two opposing global orders.

Chapter three continues this theme, this time within the context of the post-Second World War wave of decolonization. In contrast to the enthusiastic reception of the

1941 Atlantic Charter, with its explicit promise of self-determination, the Universal Declaration—without that promise—was effectively ignored by the proponents of self-determination. Later, once the newly independent states had a voice on the international stage, ‘human rights’ were adopted by the anti-colonialist movement; but only, Moyn argues, by enshrining self-determination as a human right and focusing on that ‘right’ to the exclusion of others. Moyn’s argument is again that the idealism and activism behind the anti-colonialist movement were so focused on the ‘right’ of self-determination that it must be seen as fundamentally different from the ideals that drive today’s human rights movement.

It is in chapter four that Moyn sets out the crux of the book. He demonstrates that the human rights movement of today—human rights as a ‘utopian program’—effectively arose out of two realizations of failure. First, a realization among the rapidly expanding NGO community that UN-, government-centric action on human rights since the Second World War had almost entirely failed. A minimalist, more individual approach—pioneered by Amnesty International—was the way forward. Second, a realization within the dissident movement in the Soviet Union and wider ‘Eastern Bloc’ (and later in Latin America and elsewhere) that previous attempts at change, based on grand political visions—perhaps a revitalized socialism—had also failed. Human rights—minimalist in comparison with the grand visions they replaced, and neutral, anti-political—provided a new moral approach that transcended politics.

It is on the neutrality of the human rights utopia—the ability of human rights to mean different things to different people—that Moyn ends his book. He notes that, far from remaining anti-political, the human rights movement has adopted human rights as the enabler for a host of programmes: democracy promotion, genocide prevention and, most importantly, the humanitarian concern with the alleviation of suffering. The author concludes by questioning whether this shift is desirable; whether if, in being used for political aims, human rights, which ‘still trade on the moral transcendence of politics that their original breakthrough involved’ (p. 227), are being stretched too far, and should ‘restrict themselves to offering minimal constraints on responsible politics’ (p. 227). In light of the backlash that human rights are now suffering in parts of the world (one thinks of the opprobrium, however unjustified, heaped on human rights by sections of UK society), it is a salient warning.

David Howe

International law, security and ethics: policy challenges in the post-9/11 world. Edited by Aidan Hehir, Natasha Kuhrt and Andrew Mumford. Abingdon: Routledge. 2011. 208pp. £35.00. ISBN 978 0 41560 742 1.

The conflict in Libya has, like Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo before it, drawn public attention to the debate on when it is legitimate for states to use force, and if that legitimacy can be lost because of the methods used.

The background to the war in Libya followed a pattern familiar to those who have studied previous NATO operations: an internationally unpopular leader, brutalities by the regime against its own people, and a willing coalition amid objecting states. It does also, like Iraq, involve a Security Council resolution of disputed interpretation, and like Kosovo, aerial bombardment with no occupation. Again, issues of torture and rendition have been raised. These are the very issues that *International law, security and ethics* addresses. Written before the war in Libya—or the death of bin Laden—Aidan Hehir, Natasha Kuhrt and

Andrew Mumford have assembled a collection of essays that examine various aspects of the conduct of the 'war on terror' and the war in Iraq.

The chapters are an amalgamation of three disciplines—International Relations, ethics and law. The result is quite satisfying. The reader is able to approach the same issue from multiple perspectives, even though a certain amount of intellectual rigour is lost in this approach, and parts of the book give the impression of writers struggling to reach beyond their natural discipline.

The authors' unashamed liberal slant is refreshing; the book is certainly not preachy, but it is fair to say that the writers are broadly on the same end of the spectrum. Subject to some impressive virtuoso performances from contributors, perhaps the real value in this book is to gather in one place well-argued support for liberal intuitions.

The strongest ethics analysis in the book is James Connelly and Don Carrick's discussion of how to engage in ethical and legal reasoning about conflict. By way of a canter through just war theories under the Romans, the Catholic philosophers, and in the post-Second World War settlement, they draw attention to a critical distinction: a legal war is not necessarily a sensible one. The debates on Iraq were much the weaker for missing that even if Security Council authorization was present, this does not compel action, merely permits it if wise.

Of the security studies chapters, Andrew Mumford's examination of Al-Qaeda and international insurgency provides a captivating and in-depth analysis of the way in which international Islamist insurgencies link up. His conclusion, if contentious, is fascinating: a mistake was made in treating Al-Qaeda as a terrorist rather than an insurrectionary group, and a holistic strategic approach was required to defeat it, not the operational tactical approach adopted.

The contributors are generally weaker when they write about law than when they are on more familiar ground with International Relations and ethics; however, Thomas Jones's examination of the right to self-defence is rigorous and useful. Delving down into the International Court of Justice's approach to self-defence, Jones argues that the test has become so strict as to be unrealistic, in particular against threats from guerrilla methods and non-state actors. Also impressive is Elaine Korzak's quick and practical application of the laws on the use of force to cyber threats.

Having begun by discussing Libya, I would be interested to see how the writers would approach assessing the legitimacy of that conflict. One assumes they would support the recourse to the Security Council, and the reliance on humanitarian discourse rather than existential need. Their view on the simultaneous pursuit of criminal justice and the use of force against Qadhafi is less easy to predict. They are likely to feel that the allegations of collusion in torture between the West and Libya undermine legitimacy. Nevertheless, they do not provide a clear approach or answer, and, in fact, the international community is again divided over a purportedly whiter than white military intervention. The question then is whether the disciplines applied in these chapters will ever be of a priori benefit, or if they will always be used, as they are here, to unpick wars that have essentially passed into history.

Maziar Jamnejad

International organization and foreign policy

Humanitarianism contested: where angels fear to tread. By Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss. Abingdon: Routledge. 2011. 192pp. Pb.: £18.99. ISBN 978 0 41549 664 3.

A feature of contemporary writings on world politics is the use of corporate terms. Aid was once thought of as a sphere in which actors responded to the needs of strangers by giving money; aid was intimately connected with moral conscience. Reflecting the commercialization of politics, it is now described as a business within a wider humanitarian 'industry'. How we understand this industry—the donor suppliers, the actors that distribute relief and the consumers of aid—is the subject of this outstanding book.

Humanitarianism contested is the 51st book in the Routledge Global Institutions series, of which Thomas Weiss is one of the series editors. The other is Rorden Wilkinson. In his foreword, Wilkinson writes that Barnett and Weiss 'are at the top of their game'. On the evidence of this book, it would be churlish to disagree with this evaluation. According to the authors, the book has been written for 'professionals and students'. These two audiences are hard to connect; professionals often want in-depth knowledge while students—undergraduates at least—want breadth of coverage. In fact, the two audiences will not agree on much, other than wanting a book on humanitarianism that is short, penetrating and accessibly written. In *Humanitarianism contested* they have one.

The book is structured symmetrically. Three historical chapters are between an opening chapter on 'Humanitarianism: the essentials' and a final chapter on the possible futures of humanitarianism framed around ten guiding questions.

There are many detailed histories of specific humanitarianism crises and/or responses. What sets this book apart is the clever way in which the empirics of the humanitarian order are coupled to wider normative questions about how that order has evolved and what the main drivers of change are. As we read in chapter four, one of the key changes in the early twenty-first century has been the doctrine of 'sovereignty as responsibility'; in other words, making traditional sovereign prerogatives dependent upon good behaviour (or at least, avoiding the worst kind of atrocity crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity).

Responsibility to protect (R2P) is an area of the humanitarian order that remains controversial, especially when forcible 'last resort' action is being advocated (or undertaken). Here the critics of R2P would invoke the book's subtitle, albeit with the full Alexander Pope phrase: 'fools rush in where angels fear to tread'.

When discussing their use of 'where angels fear to tread', the authors intriguingly note that unlike the English essayist they do not question the sanity of those who feel compelled to 'rush in' when an emergency breaks out. Indeed, as the final chapter makes clear, for Michael Barnett at least, a willingness to assist those who are in distress is the best reason for thinking that there exists some kind of world community. For Weiss, on the other hand, talk of community on a global scale is a dishonest shorthand that shelters those actors who 'are actually responsible for exacerbating or mitigating humanitarian problems' (p. 125).

The book ends very strongly. Apart from the open dialogue between the authors, the answers they give to 'ten guiding questions' provides important intellectual and normative puzzles that will engage both practitioners and students alike.

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Humanitarian intervention: a history. Edited by Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2011. 408pp. Index. £60.00. ISBN 978 0 52119 027 5.

The conflict in Libya has reawakened the debate around ‘liberal’ or ‘humanitarian’ intervention. The United Nations has sanctioned the use of force against a sovereign state in order to protect Libyan citizens, and a coalition of western powers have launched an air campaign against Colonel Qadhafi’s violent and corrupt regime. So far, this military intervention appears to be achieving its stated objectives, yet the dark shadow of the 2003 Iraq invasion is not far from many people’s minds.

Unsurprisingly, then, *Humanitarian intervention* is one of a number of books on interventionism being released this year. Others include Nathan Hodge’s *Armed humanitarians: the rise of the nation builders* (Bloomsbury); Michael Barnett’s *Empire of humanity: a history of humanitarianism* (Cornell University Press); Anne Orford’s *International authority and the responsibility to protect* (Cambridge University Press); and Alex Bellamy’s *Global politics and the responsibility to protect* (Routledge); many more are likely to come.

This particular edited volume sets itself apart by providing a truly historic perspective, claiming—probably rightly—that most scholarship on interventionism covers only the period since the Second World War, when the language of and concepts around humanitarian intervention, though not necessarily its values, arose. Instead, editors Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim attempt to lay out how the international state system and common interests of ‘Christendom’ of the sixteenth century have evolved into the modern concepts of human rights and humanitarianism. Chapters cover subjects from Protestantism in early modern Europe and the Peace of Westphalia to the Napoleonic Wars, nineteenth-century anti-slavery policy and Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia from 1978 to 1989. Emphasis definitely lies on pre-twentieth-century history; interventions in the 1990s (Bosnia, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, among others)—to many, the most pivotal period, both celebrated and notorious, giving rise to the notion of ‘right to protect’—are covered in just one chapter in the final ‘postscript’ section.

While many readers will be looking for arguments which help to either justify or condemn modern intervention, this book does neither explicitly. The chapters are described as ‘empirical assessments’, looking at specific historical moments when sustained actions were taken to end oppression, tyranny or persecution in another state, mostly but not entirely from the perspective of western, and Christian, experience. Normative judgements, we are told, are secondary to exploring what did happen and why.

The resultant case-studies provide interesting but quite dense reading. Davide Rodogno’s chapter on the European powers’ intervention in Macedonia, for example, is an intensely detailed historical account of events and actors between 1903 and 1908, and Maeve Ryan’s chapter on the West African slave trade is similar in format in its blow-by-blow take on abolition. Thomas Probert’s chapter on the Jackson-Vanik amendment (a 1974 provision in United States federal law, intended to affect trade relations with countries that restrict freedom of emigration and other human rights) is, on the other hand, much more engaged in issues of ideology and the emergence of new discourses, although this seems the exception rather than the rule.

Among the quite disparate chapters, the overarching theme of evolving humanitarian concepts gets a little lost, possibly because there is just too much information on display. One of Simms and Trim’s expressed objectives is to show the ‘rich and varied’ history of humanitarian intervention, which is definitely achieved; however, in doing so, the volume

ends up hanging together by only a few loose threads. Similarly, by covering so much, it is harder to draw out the examples that are most relevant to today.

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The future of power. By **Joseph S. Nye Jr.** New York: Public Affairs. 2011. 320pp. £16.99. ISBN 978 1 58648 891 8.

Building upon previous works on power—‘soft’ and ‘smart’—and interdependence, Joseph Nye argues that information has become a crucial commodity in the twenty-first century. Even though *The future of power* was published on the eve of the Arab Spring, Nye presciently describes what has been dubbed the ‘information revolution’, and the ways in which the command and production of information—from WikiLeaks to the role of Twitter in the Iranian election to cyberwar—have markedly altered the landscape of international politics. In such an environment, Nye posits that ‘narratives become the currency of soft power’. Citing John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, he writes, ‘politics in an information age “may ultimately be about whose story wins”’ (p. 104).

In his description of how America might navigate this new terrain (through policy lessons which he argues can be extended to other countries), Nye unpacks the traditional ‘faces’ of power: military, economic (which includes an excellent potted history of energy and interdependence) and soft. He reminds us that soft power is not by definition benign (‘it is not necessarily better to twist minds than arms’, p. 81); however, as in earlier works, he seems to suggest an incorporation of soft power into policy is advisable. Despite its attraction, soft power is not always the first choice of politicians: as Nye points out, both decision-makers and their constituencies are often too impatient to wait for the results, which are often slower to come than the effects of hard power. (By extension, one wonders whether we will witness a temporary dissipation in soft power preferences during the intense election period of the coming months, as presidential elections dominate the agenda in countries such as France, Russia and the United States).

Next, taking account of the shifts and discontinuities which have characterized the last decade—the diffusion of power from state to non-state actors, from closely knit and discernible hierarchies to what he calls ‘lightly-structured’ networks (p. 138)—Nye charts out his argument for a kind of ‘smart power’ for America in the midst of continued declarations of its decline. ‘Smart’ power is not just about ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ power or ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’; rather, it is about a creative blend of the ‘3 Ds’ of Hillary Clinton’s State Department—that is defence, diplomacy and development. Such a holistic approach to foreign policy-making, Nye argues, is of crucial importance as the US seeks to construct and transmit a compelling narrative in the twenty-first century.

But perhaps we can create a distinction between two different types of narratives: external narratives—that is the image of the city or shining beacon on the hill, the idea of living by example to others, beneficial to one’s own political credibility abroad—and internal narratives—that is the story you tell yourself. As the last decade has shown, the United States and its allies have often been less than skilled at living by example. And with the Obama administration came the hope that the United States could change its tone and supplant the swashbuckling interventionist policies of the Bush White House—so disruptive to America’s relations and legitimacy—with softer versions of what Nye calls ‘agenda-setting’, ‘attraction’ and ‘persuasion’ (p. 90). Indeed, since the Iraq war debacle, many scholars in the United States have been quick to chart out ways in which America might repair its image on the world stage; and yet, the more challenging question for the

United States and the wider West might be that of an *internal* narrative. What do you tell yourself as the United States and Europe, continuing to postpone critical questions on the future of your interlinked economies, inhibited on one side of the Atlantic by a nihilistic Congress, and on the other, by an endless debate on clashing interests of the public and private sectors—and in the case of both Europe and America, having declared a premature victory in a third war in a Muslim country? What kind of a story do you tell yourself?

Thus, one could argue that to focus on the language of power in such a context seems slightly out of place. Why? Because the instant one mentions the word ‘power’, one brings an ‘other’ into the picture, and how one might be able to influence, affect or direct someone or something. For example: if I tell someone that he or she holds tremendous power (in whatever guise), it is likely that he or she will immediately conjure a way he can wield that power over someone or something. However, if on the contrary I tell the same person that he or she harbours reserves of energy, this will probably lead that person to think in terms of internal capacity or capability. One way of thinking lends itself to expense—the other, to sustainability and regeneration. And in a post-Lehman/post-Libya world, it is very costly to think in terms of ‘power’. And yet, returning to the ‘currency’ of the narrative, it is much easier to tell your voting publics a story about the rise of China and the need to prepare for potential confrontation in a zero-sum game than about the need to heal and internally regenerate oneself, which is neither a zero-sum nor a positive-sum game, for there are no other players.

Crucially, the West’s choices in its enduring fiscal crisis and its perpetual interventions were its own doing: contrary to some observations, the rise of China did not catalyse America’s (or indeed Europe’s) decline. Risk is self-referential, and the gravest risk that these countries face—that of financial collapse—originates from within the West. Rather than deliberating in terms of ‘power’ and hence in perpetuating an ‘other’, the key at this moment is to adopt a language of capacity, capability and internal regeneration. Unlike the language of power, it is not the stuff of attraction or grandeur—however, it is much better suited to the task at hand—which currently for the West is to ‘heal itself’.

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A contest for supremacy: China, America, and the struggle for mastery in Asia. By **Aaron L. Friedberg**. New York: W. W. Norton. 2011. 384pp. Index. £19.99. ISBN 978 0 39306 828 3.

In 1907 Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office penned his famous memorandum in which he accounted for ‘the present state of British relations with France and Germany’. He concluded that Britain should meet imperial Germany with ‘unvarying courtesy and consideration’, while maintaining ‘the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe’. Crowe saw the economic advance of Germany on a global scale as a danger to the British Empire that had to be countered.

In *A contest for supremacy*, the United States has received its own Crowe memorandum, this time from a former adviser to Vice-President Dick Cheney, Aaron L. Friedberg. Most would agree that the Sino-American relationship is of paramount importance in maintaining international stability. The reason for this is that in 2011 the presumed multipolar world order looks distinctly bipolar. China and America are in a league of their own. This again raises the Huntingtonian question: is America doomed to clash with rival civilizations, including the largest of them all?

Friedberg's book provides a hard-nosed counter-position to Henry Kissinger's new book *On China* (Penguin, 2011). Where the father of Sino-American detente strolls through China's twentieth century, Friedman focuses on the twenty-first. Where Kissinger hedges his bets, Friedberg goes all in. Where Kissinger sees the Chinese ideal focused on 'subtlety, indirection and patient accumulation of relative advantage' (p. 45), Friedberg argues, in effect, that China should be contained, or in the very least balanced again. In this prediction he departs from the mainstream academic establishment, which tends to embrace a normative view that sees zero-sum Great Power rivalry in Asia as a worst-case scenario.

That said, Friedberg's book is not alarmist. On the contrary, it offers a considered and compelling examination of the Sino-American relationship from various angles. The author casts a cold eye on the game board; explains the moves that left the pieces in their current pattern; and deduces from the temperament and past choices of the two players how the game is likely to evolve. He concludes that the most probable scenario is that the United States will be forced to reduce its footprint in Asia, and that this is more likely to happen 'with a whimper than with a bang'. This is a result of China's grand strategy of accumulating power resources while avoiding confrontation to a point where the military balance in the Western Pacific will tilt sharply in China's favour, thereby creating a new status quo.

The book is well written and well contrived. The author takes care to point out cases for optimism where such cases are to be found, for instance 'economic interdependence, the possible evolution of China towards liberal democracy, its ongoing integration into a web of international institutions, the presence of common threats and the existence of nuclear weapons'. He carefully examines cooperative scenarios, and after due consideration concludes that the forces for rivalry (i.e. the quest for power and prestige) are stronger. In his analysis Friedberg challenges the dominant view in Washington, articulated *inter alia* by Fareed Zakaria, that the United States is wise to seek to prolong its leading position in the international system by managing its decline in a manner that avoids clashing with rising powers.

Friedberg sees balance-of-power diplomacy less as a choice than as an inevitability. The reason why America should resist China's incremental push-back is that: 'if we permit an illiberal China to displace us [America] as the preponderant player in this most vital region [Asia] we will face grave dangers to our interests and our values throughout the world' (p. 8). The prediction is that either China has to be stopped in its tracks, or the United States will lose its elevated global position.

One limitation of the book is that Friedberg does not speak Mandarin. As a result, the book is rich in the details on American policy considerations, while the Chinese position is often inferred. This is a potential weakness since China is a country which, if we are to believe Henry Kissinger, is dictated by the past more than other countries, often taking policy advice from 'a millennium old event' (p. 12). Most China specialists, after adding up all the pluses and minuses, remain uncertain as to where China is headed. Friedberg, by contrast, is certain that China is destined to become a superpower. The more cautious China scholars will have no difficulty in spotting where qualifications are called for. Indeed, China has developmental problems that may keep it from living up to John Mearsheimer's dictum, quoted in the book, that 'potential hegemons [are] strongly inclined to become real hegemons' (p. 41).

In one sense, this book is reminiscent of a number of those dealing with US-Japan relations that were published in the 1980s. The argument then was that Japan and America were on a collision course because of Japan's intention to dominate Asia economically. Ten years later, it seems clear that those books missed the mark. To be sure, Friedberg's pessi-

mistic version of US–China relations is a possible, indeed likely, future scenario. But it is open to debate whether the book provides sufficient attention to the ‘internal contradictions’ of modern China. In practice, Chinese power is often less effective than is generally assumed.

In fairness, Friedberg does warn against the tendency to assume that prevailing trends continue indefinitely. Potential stumbling blocks for China are poor capital allocation that can spark financial crisis (the 1997 Asian financial crisis); a failure to sustain growth (Japan’s lost decade); the demographic bomb stemming from the one-child policy; and the tensions between the haves and the have-nots in a society whose chasm between the wealthy few and the vast majority is a continuous source of political tension. A further challenge is the latent danger of political extremism that has been seen in other societies when a rural population is uprooted and millions of young men congregate in the cities.

But it would be mean-spirited to complain of the choice of focus, when the author is so open about the analytical choices he has made and why. This is a book that will be read broadly and discussed widely. Like the Crowe memorandum, *A contest for supremacy* is a nuanced warning about the risks in bilateral Great Power relations and the ways to avoid sleepwalking into decline. And like Crowe, Friedberg argues that the established Great Power should not voluntarily cede geopolitical ground to the revisionist power. This is text-book Realist analysis, one that propels Friedberg to the high table of American politics scientists. In its well-crafted prose, clarity of thought and willingness to draw conclusions and stand by them, he emerges as a possible heir to his mentor, Samuel Huntington.

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Conflict, security and defence

Military Orientalism: eastern war through western eyes. By Patrick Porter. London: Hurst. 2010. 256pp. Index. Pb.: £14.99. ISBN 978 1 85065 959 4.

In *Military Orientalism*, Patrick Porter addresses the western fascination with ‘Oriental’ culture and its supposed influence on the martial spirit of eastern warriors. The book challenges the premise that race, culture and tradition are reliable and largely unchanging indicators of how societies wage war. Historical and contemporary western notions of eastern culture and approaches to war are deconstructed and shown to be equally flawed. The conflicts of the past decade, and the spectre of Islamist terrorism, have served to revive examination of the relationship between war and culture. Far from being static and inflexible, this relationship is revealed to be dynamic and supple, and full of surprises for those who enter a conflict believing that culture determines the opponent’s method of warfare.

Renewed interest in cultural anthropology has emerged, most notably in the United States, stemming from the perceived failure to understand the Arab and Asian ‘mind’ (i.e. culture, customs, politics and behaviour), and from the way in which ‘cultural insensitivity’ is believed to have exacerbated the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book usefully questions the validity of this approach, and looks at the extent to which the focus on eastern culture and ‘ways of war’ is useful or misleading. It is noted that ‘civilizations define themselves most sharply through their clashes’, and that ‘it is not a question of whether culture matters, but *how* it matters, and how to conceptualise it’.

The book begins with a historical overview of military ‘Orientalism’—defined as the way in which westerners have defined and represented the East, and in a larger context how the ‘self’ of the West relates to the ‘other’ of the East. It argues that western identity

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has often been debated internally through particular conceptions of eastern warriors (for instance western freedom, democracy and civilization as opposed to eastern noble savages, barbarian hordes or irrational zealots). It examines how military Orientalism has been updated during recent conflicts, as counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine has emerged that contains flawed and ahistorical assumptions about the culturally sensitive nature of previous COIN campaigns.

Focus then turns to two historical examples from the Orient that were used by westerners to critique their own societies. The first case-study looks at the opinions of British military observers during and after the Russo-Japanese war (1904–5). They were impressed with Japanese discipline, martial spirit and success against the Russians, and believed these qualities could be imitated and used as a guide to rehabilitate the British Empire. The second study examines western perceptions of the Mongols, who were portrayed simultaneously as barbarians and as models of military manoeuvre, organization and excellence.

The closing chapters look at the contemporary examples of the US-led war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the 2007 war between Israel and Hezbollah. In both cases the more powerful military force was stymied by the unexpected flexibility of its opponent's strategic culture. In addition, opponents in both conflicts portrayed themselves in certain ways, and these projections were often perceived by the opposite side as the true picture rather than the propaganda that it often was.

The reader is reminded that culture can be refashioned, moulded and instrumentalized to serve pressing needs during conflict. In the 'strategic interaction' of war, all parties to the conflict are changed in ways they may not immediately understand. Al-Qaeda effectively fused religious belief with non-Muslim strategic thought and modern technology regularly to frustrate westerners, who perceived their opponents as irrational, fanatical and pre-modern. In the years after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States strove to win the 'hearts and minds' of Iraqis, guided in part by stereotypes and flawed assumptions of Iraqi culture. The world's most powerful military force tried to teach its soldiers to function also as diplomats, linguists and social anthropologists, with mixed results.

Ultimately it is noted that 'culture is an ambiguous repertoire of competing ideas that can be selected, instrumentalized, and manipulated, instead of a clear script for action'. One-dimensional caricatures of the 'other'—both positive and negative—can be equally misleading. Cultural realism—which recognizes that culture is flexible and changing—is a more useful lens for viewing an adversary than those versions that see culture as acting upon and imposing a fixed set of traditions on its inert subjects.

This is an accessible and well-written book for a wide range of audiences. The author has a solid grasp of the historical material and has bravely tackled a contentious yet persistent issue—Orientalism—through the lens of military conflict, and the reader is wiser as a result. The book clearly elaborates how indulging in envy and self-critique through cultural observations of the exotic 'other' often leads to misleading and reductionist conclusions. We are reminded that globalization and the reciprocal nature of war combine to influence all parties to a conflict. In a complex and fast-moving age when control and certainty are prized commodities, it is good to be reminded that culture defies both.

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Governance, civil society and cultural politics

Women under Islam: gender, justice and the politics of Islamic law. By Christina Jones-Pauly with Abir Dajani Tuqan. New York and London: I. B. Tauris. 2011. 560pp. £59.50. ISBN 978 1 84511 386 5.

The book is organized around four country-specific case-studies, each detailing the trajectory of Islamic law over the centuries. The first case is Tunisia, which is presented in a largely uncritical frame. The chapter concludes that the relatively fluid social hierarchies in Tunisia have allowed an egalitarian and flexible legal framework to be adopted. The second chapter moves to Egypt. Here, the author argues that developments were hindered because elite women did not sufficiently empathize with working-class women's plights. Christina Jones-Pauly also notes that women's rights have been sidelined because of the militarization of society and the state; this serves as a cautionary reminder for current campaigners following the Arab Spring. The chapter on Pakistan reveals how the instrumental politicization of Islam impacts on the development of the law to the detriment of women, but also how the highest law courts have worked to minimize the damage. The last case-study on South Africa finds that the principle of 'separate but equal', or just 'separate' under apartheid, has not worked to the advantage of Muslim women, but that some degree of legal pluralism can be beneficial. The chapters focus on 'women's issues' and 'women' rather than gender. The final chapter summarizes the legal and religious arguments, and concludes that the law courts remain the best guarantor of justice for women in the contemporary world.

The advantage of this case-study structure is that it highlights the diversity and dynamics of Islamic jurisprudence. Importantly, the author shows that jurisprudence is not a linear journey of 'progress' (however defined) but a constant search for justice—which is sometimes successful and sometimes not. This is crucial, as too often popular debates are narrowly put in terms of support (or otherwise) of a singular backward-looking Shari'a. In contrast, Jones-Pauly reminds readers that it is a 'brilliance of the *Quran* to offer the choice to be progressive or conservative, emancipatory or patriarchal' (p. 457). This choice, she argues, allows new laws to develop and old ones to adapt, and jurists constantly to seek justice in all circumstances. It is clear that the author favours a progressive and emancipatory understanding of Islamic law.

To highlight the author's favoured Islamic legal arguments, there are suggestions about how historic and contemporary thinkers 'could' have extended their liberal interpretations further. Limitations of existing laws and their implementation in relation to women's rights are followed by suggestions as to how they can be remedied. Some might find this normative agenda distracting, but I would argue it is useful as it is, if indirectly, an example of contemporary *ijtihad* (legal reasoning).

We also see how legal reasoning often relies on changes in the social and political context, so chapters include a review of the general situation in which legal thinkers were writing. Given the recourse to the Sunnah (the stories and life of the prophet, contra the *Qur'an* which is 'revealed' text from God) in much Islamic jurisprudence, this method here is unsurprising. However, why certain laws were then put in place, but not others, or why some interpretations and theorists dominated law courts, despite the availability of liberal Islamic legal reasoning, is not made explicit in each chapter. Often this task is left to the chapters' conclusions, but the reasons put forward do not always draw upon the previous discussions. Ultimately, the politics of law itself is not foregrounded in the book; as Tony Evans argued in *The politics of human rights* (Pluto, 2005), this prioritizing of legal conceptions over any other is characteristic of human rights debates generally.

This foregrounding of formal law also makes the title somewhat misleading. The latter implies that there will be detailed discussion about how Muslim women have lived and live under Islamic laws; how they access the laws; how successful or otherwise women are at changing, challenging and implementing laws; and how their gender is theorized. Yet there are few socio-political data included in the book, and little reference to informal (that is shadow or parallel) laws that also shape women's lives. This makes it harder to assess the gender justice and politics of Islamic law.

Therefore the book covers the legal and religious arguments and jurisprudence that underpin laws rather than the politics of law. It is largely about the varied developments in Islamic thinking on women's place, rights and responsibilities in law. This is, in itself, a valuable thing. The book will be primarily of relevance to those beginning their studies of Islamic law, practitioners working with Muslim communities, and those wanting a review of the legal history of the four countries.

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Political economy, economics and development

Global poverty: how global governance is failing the poor. By David Hulme. London: Routledge. 2010. 246pp. Index. Pb.: £21.99. ISBN 978 0 41549 078 8.

Global governance, poverty and inequality. Edited by Jennifer Clapp and Rorden Wilkinson. London: Routledge. 2010. 324pp. Index. Pb.: £26.99. ISBN 978 0 41578 049 0.

Global poverty received significant attention from international news media and academia over a decade ago but, as interest in the UN Millennium Goals slowly waned, focus has shifted to other subjects. That is a shame, since the issue remains as vital to our collective future as ever; to paraphrase the Gospel of Matthew, the poor always will be with us. At least in academia, the book by David Hulme, along with the edited volume by Jennifer Clapp and Rorden Wilkinson, may recover some of that attention and stimulate some discussion.

Global poverty is the better of the two books under review, and is recommended for anyone seeking to gain quickly a better understanding of global poverty—or for any teacher looking for an excellent text on the subject. It is a direct, no-nonsense, multi-disciplinary examination of the nature of poverty, with its subtitled focus on the gross failures of global governance to address the problem. Although 189 nations committed to the Millennium Goals in 2000, it amounted to 'the world's most successful confidence trick', with the rich countries, key organizations and elites keeping their global control 'at next to no cost for themselves' (p. 2). The book discusses the various reasons why poverty is considered a vital issue, including the moral desire to reduce human suffering; self-interest to improve conditions in one's community; the duty of developed countries to help out because they created the international economic system; and recognition that solutions to global problems require global solutions. The interaction of material or technical capabilities, ideas about poverty (for instance neo-liberal vs the political left) and institutional arrangements determines approaches used to tackle poverty. Such approaches range from poverty alleviation to eradication, and encompass efforts to improve local conditions through micro-credit, enhancing human rights and reducing inequality.

Hulme begins with a sweeping historical overview, suggesting that human living conditions gradually improved over the course of history to 1820. Things then improved dramatically by 1950, poverty became a major issue by 1990, and the post-Cold War era has

seen poverty become a central concern of UN summitry. He outlines the battles between neo-liberals and their critics over prescriptions for attacking poverty; though the neo-liberal orthodoxy has weakened, it still dominates international organizations and ‘privileges growth over human development’ (p. 75). The institutional environment is quite complex, as it involves several levels of governance and many types of organizations. The international community has been unable to agree on institutional reform since its priorities lay elsewhere—national security, economic growth, trade and financial policy, and so on. The central ‘paradox’ of the global poverty agenda is that much initiative for action comes from leaders and organizations in developed countries, while the governments and organizations in developing countries play only a ‘secondary role’ (p. 107). Nonetheless, relatively new institutional arrangements, such as the G20 and the European Union, have marginally improved the ability of the system to act.

Using a policy cycle model to illustrate how poverty policy has been made over the past decade, Hulme shows that, despite various modifications at every stage of the policy process, most of the changes have been superficial, and accountability has not advanced. Policy commitments have grown, but plans relate to ‘what can be afforded and not what is needed’ (p. 142). Secondary paradoxes of global governance also hobble international anti-poverty efforts. Growing support for ‘country-specific strategies and plans’ collides with domination by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (pp. 166–7). Both aid donors and recipient countries accept the need for enhanced effectiveness and coordination of aid, but few countries have actually improved their handling of aid. The Doha Round of trade negotiations was supposed to focus on the needs of developing countries, yet much of the discussion there has centred on liberalizing trade.

Hulme adds that one’s attitude determines understanding of future issues. Climate change may be the most significant of these, and could produce either an environmental ‘apocalypse’ or a greater sense of unity that could be put to use fighting poverty. The book concludes with a programme of action for international agencies and national leaders, as well as individuals.

This is a very strong summation of world poverty issues, but it tends towards the conventional. Biased towards aid-focused, government-centric programmes, and against market-based or locally focused solutions, the book’s main concerns are the same as most works on the subject: international organizations, the role of governments, and the ideological struggle over the direction of economic development. Calling the Millennium Goals a great con game is unfair to the dedicated non-governmental organizations (NGOs), politicians, civil servants and international organizations that have worked hard to achieve them. As Hulme recognizes, the real problem may be priorities: the developed and major developing nations remain stuck in a post-Cold War world dominated by terrorism, national insecurity and economic stagnation.

The edited volume by Jennifer Clapp and Rorden Wilkinson focuses on governance as it relates to poverty. The editors respond to three research questions, tying all chapters to them: what role do current international institutions and systems of global governance perform in curtailment of poverty and alleviating inequality; what have been the major successes and failures of such international efforts; and how can global institutions and systems be ‘reformed or redesigned to be more effective’ in dealing with poverty and inequality (p. 3)? They feel that much progress has been made in ‘improving the human condition’ in the past 30 years (p. 4), including reducing infant mortality and the percentage living in extreme poverty and extending life expectancy, but income and wealth inequality have actually increased. This is especially true in terms of distribution

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among nations, though conditions for the poorest in some countries, such as China, have improved.

The book concentrates on a few key areas, and its contributors pull no punches. The first is an overview of international governance of poverty and inequality. Eric Helleiner provides comprehensive background on development and governance, and suggests that American New Dealers' desire to extend their vision of social welfare, combined with political input from emerging developing countries, put development issues on the early Bretton Woods and UN agendas. Albert Berry fires a refreshingly withering broadside at the poverty and inequality record of developed countries. Some progress was made in promoting small-scale agricultural production, but this has been cancelled out by failures in most other areas. Second is the role of the IMF and World Bank. Bessma Momani flays the IMF for its unwillingness to change its organizational culture in order to better confront developmental problems. Asserting that the debate on democratization of the World Bank misses the mark, Catherine Weaver says that a democratized Bank would not be more able to confront poverty issues.

Third is the international debt problem. Thomas Callaghy outlines the evolution of the Paris Club, an informal mechanism to renegotiate the debt problem, and shows how NGOs have used the process to gain greater influence in the process. The last area is the actions of alternative actors in poverty reduction. A discussion of public–private partnerships is particularly intriguing: Benedicte Bull believes that elite-driven partnerships generally accomplish much more than community-oriented counterparts, but their connections with powerful people implicitly undercut their effectiveness.

A generally strong collection, the book is weighed down by weaknesses that need to be dealt with in subsequent series volumes. Like Hulme, Clapp and Wilkinson betray a bias against neo-liberal economic ideas and governance, and, in this case, ideas outside the mainstream of academic discourse on global poverty. Inclusion of at least one neo-liberal author—and perhaps a socialist, dependencista or world systems scholar—might have provided a bit more balance. The editors' mocking of US Senator John McCain's 2008 proposal to create a League of Democracies amounts to beating a straw man (the idea gained no traction in that year's election). The book could use more discussion of ways to elevate the generally low profile of global poverty issues, or possible future paths for international governance. More on national or bilateral aid efforts, especially by European and Japanese donors, would strengthen the chapters, as would more discussion of private, especially NGO, efforts to fight poverty (e.g. the Himalayan and African 'consensus' approach). Usage of celebrities such as Bono and Angelina Jolie brought more attention to debt and poverty than a hundred academic studies and, except for one brief reference, this also goes unmentioned. In any case, these books provide a good starting point for more informed discussion of world poverty and inequality.

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Energy, resources and environment

China, oil and global politics. By Philip Andrews-Speed and Roland Dannreuther. London: Routledge. 2011. 233pp. Index. £85.00. ISBN 978 0 41560 395 9.

China's energy relations with the developing world. Edited by Carrie Liu Currier and Manoj Kumar Das. London: Continuum. 2011. 221pp. Index. Pb.: £17.99. ISBN 978 1 44114 104 0.

China's rise as a world power is one of the most talked-of developments shaping international affairs today. Its political influence is changing global power dynamics, and the speed and scale of its economic development is realigning the world's markets. Driving this rise is a rapid increase in energy consumption in both absolute and per-capita terms, and since China relies heavily on imports to satisfy its energy needs, energy policy might naturally be supposed to be a key factor in the country's international relations. That this is indeed the case is clearly shown in the two books under review, both of which address the issue of China's burgeoning energy demand and its implications for the country's foreign policy.

The book by Philip Andrews-Speed and Roland Dannreuther is divided into two parts: the first is a succinct description of the energy challenges faced by China; the domestic context of its energy policy; and the growing engagement of the country's oil and gas industry with the international energy sector. The second is a general analysis, couched in terms of International Relations theory, of the implications of China's international energy policies for the country's foreign policy, and its approach to international relations generally.

The volume edited by Carrie Liu Currier and Manojeh Dorraj, on the other hand, represents the combined efforts of twelve authors, and focuses on China's 'energy relations' with developing countries specifically. This book centres on a series of regional case-studies of China's relationships in the developing world, preceded by outlines of the context of China's foreign and energy policies, and followed by discussions of the prospects of China's quest for energy security and successful integration in the international system.

Both books are highly accessible while remaining informative as well as nuanced in their analysis. Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther's book in particular manages to convey a substantial amount of information on a technical subject without overloading the reader or making the book inaccessible to non-specialists.

In assessing the implications of China's energy policies, both books come to broadly the same conclusion: that fears of a revisionist China, driven by an insatiable hunger for natural resources and seeking to overturn the existing system of international relations, are not borne out by reality. They argue that, although China insists on international engagement on its own terms, maintaining its alternative view of political legitimacy, its main objective is still to become integrated in the global political and economic system without challenging the interests of other powers directly. In this sense the authors are optimistic that China's increasing energy needs offer opportunities for positive engagement in addition to risks of conflict.

Nor is there much basis to the notion of a neo-imperialist China plundering the natural resources of Africa, Central Asia and South America, starving the rest of the world of energy and propping up dictators and rogue states in the process. As pointed out in the volume edited by Currier and Dorraj, China's investment in African oil is still dwarfed by that of western countries and international oil companies (IOCs). Being a latecomer with little previous connections in relevant areas, China is often forced to pay over the odds for deals rejected by IOCs, and has to deal with established national governments that are often adept at playing off oil companies against each other.

Similarly, the spectre of 'China Inc.', a unified political and commercial entity directed by the Chinese government according to a coherent national energy strategy, turns out to be largely a mirage. Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther show that the internationalization of China's energy sector has generally been driven by the profit motives of national oil companies (NOCs), with the government only subsequently catching up. China's successful expansion in Africa in the 1990s, for example, was partly due to a convergence

of the interests of China's government and NOCs, and recent years have seen an increasing divergence of these interests.

In fact, Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther highlight the lack of predictability, even for domestic NOCs, in Chinese energy policy. While consumption trends and path-dependency make it possible to predict long-term developments with reasonable accuracy, the fragmented and opaque nature of the Chinese political system means that in the short term energy policies are often mutually contradictory, erratically implemented and liable to sudden change. The economic, political and cultural forces shaping China's engagement with the global energy sector are many and varied, and a nuanced analytical framework is necessary to understand them and predict their influence on international affairs.

The two books each provide important factual studies that will be of value beyond the political analyses they here support. The regional case-studies in Currier and Dorraj's volume, for example, will be useful to regional specialists as well as to energy experts and China-watchers. Of particular interest is the first section of Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther's book, outlining as it does China's energy needs and policies, and the process and driving forces behind the internationalization of its energy industry.

In setting out the challenges and opportunities occasioned by China's increasing energy needs, these two books succeed in providing necessary background information and relevant political analysis in a way that is likely to prove useful to both students and experts. Of the two, Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther's book is broader in scope and offers an analysis more thoroughly based on the domestic context for China's energy policy, but the more detailed regional studies in Currier and Dorraj's volume are also likely to be well received.

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The Routledge handbook of energy security. Edited by Benjamin K. Sovacool. London and New York: Routledge. 2011. 436pp. Index. £113.72. ISBN 978 0 41559 117 1.

With oil prices still on the high side after the loss of Libyan supply and with the Fukushima disaster emboldening some governments to phase out nuclear power, energy security concerns continue to occupy centre stage in many of today's public debates. This new handbook on energy security, edited by Benjamin Sovacool of the National University of Singapore, could thus not have come at a better time. It is a comprehensive and in many respects innovative approach to the subject, which will undoubtedly make it a standard work of reference for researchers and practitioners engaged in the field.

The need for such a synthesizing work is evident. Despite a burgeoning literature on the topic, the concept of energy security remains mired in fuzziness. What exactly does the notion of energy security mean? How can we measure it? Are some countries and technologies more energy-secure than others? Is it possible to identify best practices or will a single 'fix' never be applicable across time and space? All of these questions are tackled head-on in the book and, throughout its 20 chapters, the contributors bring to bear a wide range of perspectives. Collectively, they do a wonderful job at transcending the narrow oil-centric, supply-oriented and national prisms through which energy security has traditionally been viewed. Instead, they highlight the multiple, often competing dimensions of energy security from individual households all the way up to the global level, and critically review existing indicators of energy security.

In the introduction, Sovacool sets the stage by identifying no less than 45 different definitions of energy security in the literature. He rightly asserts that this multitude of definitions serves some strategic purpose: 'it enables people to advance very different

notions of energy security so that they can then justify actions and policies on energy security grounds' (p. 3). Next, Sovacool ventures to put forward his own definition, based on four interconnected elements: availability, affordability, efficiency and stewardship. His definition is not shared by every contributing author. In the first chapter, for example, Gal Luft, Anne Korin and Eshita Gupta argue that climate change should not be factored into the energy security debate. The space that is allowed to individual authors to take different views is one particular strength of the book. In the concluding chapter, Sovacool and Tai Wei Lim elaborate on the points of contention and convergence found across the various contributions to the book.

Although it is not made explicit in the table of contents, the volume is divided into three main parts. The first part features three chapters that define and conceptualize energy security. The second part consists of eleven chapters that each deal with a different dimension of energy security, including diversification, maritime security and public policy. This part also addresses some oft-overlooked issues such as energy poverty, access and equity, and social development, another strength of the book. The six final chapters constitute the third part. They survey existing metrics and indices for measuring energy security performance. While most of the chapters have been written by scholars, contributors also include practitioners and analysts working at institutions like the International Energy Agency, infusing the book with a sound mix of both academic and more policy-oriented perspectives.

The handbook does not arrive at a single metric or a composite index of energy security, nor does it seem to suggest that one exists to be discovered that would satisfy all. Quite the contrary, the red thread that runs through the volume is the suggestion that a variety of metrics should be developed with consideration of diverse combinations of issues. Almost all authors concur on the point that energy security is a multidimensional concept involving multiple scales and time frames, and that energy security concerns are relative—that is, they differ by types of countries and communities. Another merit of the book is that it redirects attention to the underlying and often unstated assumptions in the process of indicator development. In their chapter, Aleh Cherp and Jessica Jewell argue compellingly that most of the existing indicators can be deconstructed to a few dominant discourses on energy security. They are right to claim that, ultimately, 'the choice of indicators is a political process' (p. 333).

All in all, this volume represents a powerful, nuanced and diligently researched synthesis of the current energy security debate. The next step will be to ensure that any future energy security index is devised from clear and explicit assumptions and acknowledges the issue's multidimensionality.

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Food security. By **Bryan McDonald.** Malden, MA, and Cambridge: Polity. 2010. 205pp. Index. Pb.: £15.99. ISBN 978 0 74564 808 8.

Both the famine in East Africa and the role escalating food prices played in the Arab awakening have drawn considerable attention to the issue of food security. Bryan McDonald's primer on the topic, which he broadly defines as 'the availability of food and people's ability to access it' (p. 15), is a good starting point for those new to the subject for its clear and straightforward approach. McDonald has taken care to detail all the concepts he employs in his arguments, although the ideas of Paul Collier and Thomas Friedman (pp. 35–8) will be familiar to those who frequent current affairs sections in bookstores. However,

this introductory volume covers an impressive array of topics, ranging from investment in overseas farmland (p. 104) to the spread of new diseases due to the rural poor being forced onto marginal land (p. 132), and so should be able to offer at least something new for all those with a layman's interest in the subject.

McDonald lays out a broader mandate for his work, however; he notes that International Relations theorists and political scientists have not fully engaged with 'food security issues as they relate to human security and sustainability' (p. 151), a matter made all the more pressing by global changes currently taking place. McDonald seeks to address this gap in the field, as he explicitly aims to analyse how the global food system has been altered by the machinations of a more interconnected world born out of globalization, and he identifies 'sustainability' and 'human security' as the two guiding concepts for his book (pp. 1, 149–50).

Food security is presented throughout the book as a key aspect of human security (p. 27), the establishment of which involves 'protecting and empowering the world's most vulnerable people' (p. 24). Yet, despite stressing the importance of involving individuals and communities in 'defining problems, prioritizing efforts, and developing solutions', McDonald refers far more extensively to the work of international institutions than the ideas and initiatives of communities wrought by food insecurity.

Grander theoretical goals aside, the book covers a considerable amount of material—especially impressive given its modest size. The first chapter situates food security within the newly emerging global security environment, one shaped by globalization and the shifting capacities of state and non-state actors, in order to promote the inclusion of new and changing threats into security studies (pp. 13–14). Specifically, the chapter identifies the distribution of food alongside its production as a key challenge (p. 20), and categorizes the international food system as a 'network of systems' which crucially lacks 'coherent integration' (p. 29).

The second chapter looks at the pivotal role played by food in mankind's relationship with nature and aims to show that our present food system faces unprecedented challenges on a large scale (p. 34). The chapter's section on globalization would have been better placed at the start of the book, given the frequent references to the importance of the phenomenon from the outset. However, the subsequent section on the history of the 'transitions to agriculture' (p. 40) helps compensate for this, as it carefully examines why the early development of agriculture proceeded despite hunter-gatherers being much healthier than early farmers (pp. 40–43).

Rising populations, changing demographics, altered diets, escalating food prices, new biological technologies and climate change are all discussed in the third chapter for their impact on food security (p. 54). In particular, McDonald does well to cite the complicated nature of the global food system in his doubt over claims that our eating less meat will automatically improve environmental and food security (p. 59).

The remaining chapters of the book focus on three core challenges in achieving global food security in today's world. First, the widespread problem of malnutrition must be addressed, in all three of its guises: energy deficiency, nutrient deficiency and 'excessive net energy intake' (p. 77). Second, a global food system needs to be engineered that improves food production levels and helps mitigate and adapt to the environmental impact of human activity (p. 99). Third, ensuring food safety requires the development of strategies that duly account for the 'interdependence between health and food safety' (p. 146) and successful management of an interconnected global food system that easily spreads disasters (p. 125). In addition to these systemic issues, threats such as biological terrorism

and new and re-emerging diseases must be quickly and expertly reacted to when they arise.

Food security serves as a succinct and accessible overview of an issue rising ever further up the global political agenda.

Melanie Archer

History

Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the most dangerous place on earth. By Frederick Kempe. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 2011. 579 pp. \$29.95. ISBN 978 0 39915 729 5.

First things first: read this book. But, equally, beware: *Berlin 1961* is a page-turner, written with all the vigour and verve of a spy novel, so you will have difficulty in putting it down until you have finished its 500 pages of gripping narrative.

Frederick Kempe makes the case convincingly that Berlin in 1961 was, as his subtitle says, 'the most dangerous place on earth' and he tells his tale in three parts. First, 'The players' (chapters one to six) introduces the *dramatis personae* and in particular the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, the fledgling American president John F. Kennedy, the East German leader Walter Ulbricht and the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, together with a host of advisers, diplomats, politicians and soldiers. Part two, 'The gathering storm' (chapters seven to 12, and a clear reference to the title of the first volume of Winston Churchill's *The Second World War*), builds the tension as we move through the spring and summer of 1961, including Kennedy's failed Bay of Pigs invasion and his avowedly disastrous summit with Khrushchev in Vienna. 'The showdown', part three (chapters 13 to 18), recounts events leading to the building of the Berlin Wall, the construction of the Wall itself—a study in successful stealth on a vast scale by a totalitarian regime—and then the first face-to-face confrontation of the Soviet Red Army and US troops in the Cold War, at Checkpoint Charlie. The book's epilogue, 'Aftershocks', takes us through the Cuban Missile Crisis to Kennedy's emergence as a Free World leader and his Berlin speech ('Let them come to Berlin') in June 1963. Throughout, Kempe provides new or forgotten facts of the story—Ulbricht's wily manipulation of Khrushchev, Bobby Kennedy's bizarre back channel with a Soviet spy—while presenting great men doing great deeds on a grand scale as they stride across the stage of history, their characters portrayed in bold outline, high colour and sharp relief.

Except for one: John F. Kennedy himself, about whom many questions remain. Though more nuanced than some, Kempe situates himself squarely in the revisionist camp of Kennedy historians, unawed by the halo of Camelot. He describes Kennedy's 'first mistake' (chapter four) as taking too seriously a hard-line speech by Khrushchev that chiefly reiterated previous policy positions; is unsparing in depicting Kennedy as a drugged-up womanizer; and takes the President to task for not standing up to Khrushchev's contumely.

Kempe demonstrates persuasively that Kennedy underestimated the importance to Ulbricht and Khrushchev of the flight of thousands of East Berliners to the West, and of the pressure Khrushchev felt to stanch this nuisance at the very doorstep of Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe in advance of the Party Congress of October 1961. While Khrushchev's 'fixation on Berlin had never been so single-minded' (p. 137) as in March 1961, Kennedy was pushing for a nuclear test ban. *Berlin 1961* argues that Kennedy, wilfully or unwittingly, signalled an openness to the formalization of a Soviet sphere of influence

that limited NATO's commitment to West Berlin, rather than the city as a whole—and that this leniency resulted from a lack of backbone or lack of character on Kennedy's part.

But perhaps there is another explanation, to which Kempe alludes, but which he does not explore, namely that Kennedy did not particularly like the Germans, or care much about them, and initially felt he need not bother with Berlin. In this scenario, Kennedy would be just as culpable for missing the importance of Berlin to Khrushchev, but his acquiescence to the demarcation of the Soviet sphere of influence would arise less from a lack of character than from a lack of interest. John F. Kennedy fought in the Second World War; and he visited Berlin and other areas of defeated Germany in 1945 (cf. 'Kennedy's 1945 visit to Germany', Institute for Historical Review, www.ihr.org). As Kempe recounts, Kennedy characterized the East–West confrontation over Berlin as 'a ridiculous situation' (p. 220), saying 'we didn't cause the disunity in Germany' (p. 259). So it is plausible that in drawing the line at the defence of 'West Berlin', Kennedy was deliberately seeking to avert a nuclear Armageddon and not especially bothered by what might happen to a few Germans along the way. Once the Wall was built—and the situation defused—Kennedy could go to the divided city and invoke West Berlin as a beacon of freedom in a dark sea of Soviet domination, and, in an echo of the ancient Roman whose badge of honour was 'Civis Romanus sum', Kennedy could proclaim 'Ich bin ein Berliner'.

Kempe offers a wealth of historical detail that gratifies the reader, including confirmation that Kennedy properly used the indefinite 'ein Berliner' very much on purpose (p. 500). Kempe does get one fact wrong, though, relating not to Berlin but to another German locality: the subject is a hat. Kempe twice refers to the formidable former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, as wearing a bowler (pp. 141, 154) but Acheson didn't wear a bowler; he wore a homburg.

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Who killed Hammarskjöld? The UN, the Cold War and white supremacy in Africa.
By Susan Williams. London: Hurst. 2011. 290pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 158 4.

This welcome, and highly readable, historical detective story sheds yet more mystery on the sad fate of Dag Hammarskjöld, arguably the most significant and influential UN secretary general. A Swedish economist with degrees in humanities and law, Hammarskjöld met his death in highly mysterious circumstances in September 1961 at a most crucial time of international change. The socio-economic future of the new nations emerging from colonialism, and their political development, were at the heart of the issues that Hammarskjöld had to confront in the Congo in 1960 and 1961. Cold War political and military figures in the West were then dancing somewhat awkwardly around the forces of neo-colonialism that had produced Katangan secession from the week-old independent Congo state.

The book is essentially about the question of whether Hammarskjöld's plane, en route to meet Moise Tshombe, was or was not forced to land at Ndola or sabotaged by any of the Central African white settlers or other supporters of Katangan secession. Hammarskjöld was to discuss with Tshombe the ending of the latest round of armed confrontation in Katanga that had begun on 13 September, as more efforts were made to get compliance with repeated Security Council resolutions. The problems that had produced the use of force were clearly important to many of those wanting to cling to the old colonial relations and their socio-economic systems, which had been in place in Katanga since the days of King Leopold, and which had not been significantly altered in preparation for independence. Hammarskjöld's personal role in approving the operations launched by the

UN representative in Elisabethville, Conor Cruise O'Brien, against Katangan secessionists and their European supporters, has remained controversial. And as with much else in Susan Williams's excellent and riveting enquiries into the death of the Secretary General, and the subsequent investigations, controversies have been heightened rather than put to rest by this research.

While the book makes some commendable attempts to provide background to the issues behind the secession and the reactions to it, especially the specific use of force in September, the impact of the crisis in Washington and elsewhere could have been usefully developed further if only to clarify the most likely suspects behind any possible actions against Hammarskjöld's plane. Yet the complexities of the crisis in the Congo and the implications for the UN, the Cold War, decolonization, the future of white rule, and most importantly the profits of Belgian and British capital are all too great adequately to explore in a book of this length. What the book does very well, through extremely thorough research of an international nature, is to highlight the controversies surrounding the crash and the numerous investigations into it. Susan Williams, like the international investigation, does not provide answers, but raises so many questions that to believe the crash was an accident produced by pilot error over altimeter readings becomes more and more difficult.

The list of 'oddities' about the crash is perhaps too great to weave into a coherent conspiracy theory as it begins to appear that they cannot all be consistently explained. Nevertheless, ballistic, photographic and medical experts have been used to great effect. The dubious circumstances surrounding the bullet holes in the bodies and the fuselage of the aircraft—explained by ammunition exploding in the fire; possible doctoring of a facial photograph; the presence at the airport of an MI6 agent and mercenaries working for Tshombe; the close contacts between George Young, head of MI6, and a leading Conservative member of the Katanga lobby in the Commons; the allegations of CIA involvement; and the disingenuous attempt by the British High Commissioner in Salisbury, Lord Alport, to claim at the time that the plane had 'gone elsewhere': all this has to be added to the fact that the initial inquiry and evidence were handled solely by the Northern Rhodesian government. While governmental aid from the Rhodésias had always been denied by Prime Minister Welensky, it is also clear that support for Katangan secession in 1961 from unofficial groups or individuals was definitely occurring.

Perhaps most significant are the book's revelations about how the initial inquiry was able to dismiss evidence from the sole survivor, one of Hammarskjöld's bodyguards, who was adamant that there were explosions before the crash; and also to discount the numerous eye witnesses who saw the lights of another plane flying just above Hammarskjöld's aircraft as it began the descent to Ndola. The other plane, most plausibly a Dove belonging to the Katangan air force, could have been responsible for making Hammarskjöld's plane fly at a lower altitude, but only white observers could apparently be regarded as reliable witnesses to it. It is these discounted sightings and the possible attack from the air on Hammarskjöld's aircraft which seem to provide the most convincing speculation on the crash's causes. Yet the book also has significant snippets to add to the general Congo story, all of which have been assiduously gleaned from interviews from major and often little-known archives and numerous private papers in Britain, the United States, Scandinavia, Belgium and South Africa.

Despite the comparative neglect of European enterprises, and the supporters of, and participants in, the two key companies extracting profits from the Congo—and their connections to the British government—as compared to ideas of white supremacy, this is an important piece of research. It should be read by all those concerned with the activities

Book reviews

of right-wing politicians and businessmen and their links to mercenaries, intelligence operations and European economic dominance in the post-independence Congo; and by those concerned with whoever may have been responsible for Hammarskjöld's death and the weakening of the UN.

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Documents on British policy overseas, series I, volume IX: The Nordic countries: from war to Cold War, 1944–1951. Edited by Tony Insall and Patrick Salmon. London: Routledge and Whitehall History Publishing, 2011. 440pp. Index. £90.00. ISBN 978 0 41559 476 9.

On 23 January 1948, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, sent a telegram to British embassies in Europe, the Middle East, North and South America and the Far East. In it, he acknowledged that the embryonic Cold War was now to be waged in part by propaganda: 'the developing Communist threat to the whole fabric of Western civilisation compels us to adopt a new publicity policy designed primarily to give a lead and support [to] the truly democratic elements in Western Europe, which are anti-Communist and, at the same time, genuinely progressive and reformist, in withstanding the inroads of Communism' (pp. 204–205). Among the facets of this new propaganda campaign was the promotion of higher living standards in the social-democratic countries of the free world in comparison with those of the Soviet Union. The 'broad masses of workers and peasants' in Europe were to be convinced of the reality of a better life in the non-communist world (p. 205). Three social-democratic countries were named—Britain, Sweden and New Zealand—where the standards of food, housing and wages far outstripped their Soviet equivalents. The concentration in particular on Sweden was telling as this Scandinavian country, and those others of that region (Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway) were both significant to British interests and in the frontline of the European and North Atlantic Cold War. The details of why are made impressively clear in the latest of the *Documents on British policy overseas* volumes, edited by the historians at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Titled *The Nordic countries: from war to Cold War, 1944–1951*, this collection of diplomatic documents extends the recently revitalized Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) interest in producing these much respected and valuable treasure troves (in 2006, the FCO historians edited two excellent volumes on the early 1970s dealing with the Year of Europe and the crisis in the Southern Flank and, in 2009, two further volumes concentrating on Berlin's place in the Cold War and German unification).

This new volume follows the usual format by opening with a preface, which explains the historical context of its subject-matter and offers informative summaries of the documents that make up its 369 pages. Then follows a useful list of abbreviations and, more significantly, persons quoted in the text (these lists have been a reliable short-cut for many a political/diplomatic historian and student in the past). Thereafter the reader gets a sense of what is to come in chronological summaries of the 217 documents that the editors have selected. Those summaries are object lessons for researchers seeking to condense and organize their own materials accurately and precisely. They also give the reader a taste of the kinds of documents the editors see as representative of the subject. The mainstay, as ever, are Foreign Office (FO) minutes and papers and correspondence with embassies abroad, but for those interested particularly in the propaganda element of UK–Scandinavian relations, there are also references to FO Information Research Department documentation. From early 1946, the FO began to develop measures to counter Soviet propaganda and in 1948,

the Information Research Department (IRD) was conceived as the body within Whitehall to fight the propagandist war.

What this volume shows is how central the Nordic countries were to Britain's early Cold War and how the British, with later American assistance, brought the Scandinavians into the western camp. Readers are taken from March 1944 and a letter from Sir Orme Sargent to the Cabinet Office describing Norwegian fears of Soviet incursion into northern Norway if it was left undefended, to the end of the Second World War in Europe when on 9 May 1945, one day after VE Day, Sargent warned Winston Churchill of Soviet actions over the Danish island of Bornholm, adding that 'the Russians will be in no hurry to evacuate Bornholm' (pp. 16–17). The darkening atmosphere of the early Cold War is increasingly apparent as readers move through these documents into 1946 and 1947. So too are growing concerns in London about Norwegian pacifism, Swedish neutralism and Soviet ambitions for Finland. The Scandinavian countries were strategically significant for Britain. Not only were they traditional trading partners but their geographical location was newly important, given the course of the Second World War and the proximity of the new enemy after it. Hence this volume's focus on some IRD documentation and more especially on progress towards the Atlantic Treaty of 1949. Norway was critical to both. The Secretary of the Norwegian Labour Party, M. Haakon Lie, was 'the most vigorous and able anti-Russian propagandist' in Norway (p. 250), whose publications were recommended to the FO and employed by it. And Norway's resolution towards Soviet penetration, and the possible frailty of it, certainly led Bevin to press the Americans towards a new Atlantic security system. By taking their readers from fears of Soviet aggression in the Nordic countries in the closing stages of the Second World War to the western embrace of the Scandinavians in the Atlantic Treaty, the editors of this FCO volume have done what they always do in selecting those documents which enthrall and epitomize.

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All hell let loose: the world at war 1939–45. By Max Hastings. London: HarperPress. 2011. 748pp. Index. £30.00. ISBN 978 0 00733 809 2.

Max Hastings, distinguished journalist and historian, does not write a dull sentence. One-volume histories of the Second World War inevitably, because of concision, add little to our knowledge of the conflict but they can be entertaining and provocative, and this is both.

Hastings's well-known beefs are all here. British campaigns in North Africa and Burma played little part in victory, the Russian war being decisive (90 per cent of Germans killed died on the Eastern Front). Britain 'cynically' betrayed Poland twice, in 1939 and 1945. Britain exploited the Empire and colonial subjects shamelessly, the famine in Bengal being a result (3 million died), from which only the Viceroy, Wavell, emerges with credit, observing that relief would have been forthcoming if white Europeans had been dying. Churchill is painted as particularly callous. Western Allies' armies and generals (apart from Slim, Patton and Truscott) were lacklustre compared to their air forces and navies (the US Navy, and Nimitz in particular, receive high praise). While British artillery is rightly exempted from criticism, Hastings omits to note the impact of the 6-pounder anti-tank gun (from 1942) in the desert war and in Normandy. Russian generals, like Zhukov, were markedly superior, but he 'diminished his reputation' by the 'brutish clumsiness' of the storm of Berlin. The Soviets were a ruthless 'barbarian army', whose historic hatred of Poles and of Germans led to wholesale murder and rape of prisoners and civilians. But they destroyed the German army. Japan's army was resourceful, brave, brutal and tough but was beaten

when facing Slim in the open. Although Hitler's war effort was conducted with 'stunning incompetence', the German army was superb, often led by brilliant generals (like Manstein, von Rundstedt, Guderian and Kesselring), who nevertheless lacked or lost all moral compass in their ambition or misplaced loyalty to Hitler. Manstein was a war criminal, Kesselring complicit in atrocities. Rommel he regards as overreaching himself through 'vanity and ambition'. Manstein was so squeamish about von Rundstedt's bad language that he would leave rooms rather than be sullied by such obscenities. Yet in Poland where he served as von Rundstedt's Chief of Staff, he was less fastidious when it came to shooting refugees trying to flee Warsaw's destruction. His 'slavishness towards Hitler seldom flagged', says Hastings, like that of most German generals, even in the last months of the war when it was palpably lost, 'to their perpetual dishonour'. Hastings refers to their 'moral bankruptcy'. He contradicts himself, however, when he praises the defender of Cassino, General von Senger und Etterlin—'a good German'—for soldiering on 'like the fine professional he was' despite knowing that (in the general's words) 'we have lost this war'.

Hastings is fair to Italian soldiers, undone by 'deplorable' leadership in the field. He is contemptuous of those Frenchmen who preferred home or Vichy to de Gaulle after Dunkirk, and of the largely mythic resistance and the vengeful internecine killings that followed liberation; and of Vichy's supine acquiescence to Hitler—for example, to his moving 17,000 troops from Italy to Vichy Tunisia in 1943. He points out, rightly, the imbalance in casualties between the Allies, the Soviets being prepared to accept appalling slaughter whereas the western democracies were not, answerable as they were to an electorate sensitive to grotesque butchers' bills, after the horror of the Great War. Civilian casualties were similarly disproportionate. Hastings quotes a figure of 632,253 dead in the siege of Leningrad alone, most from starvation, more than the dead of the US and British armies combined. In contrast, Britain lost 67,000 civilians in the entire war (the Germans lost 200,000 from Allied air attacks alone, many thousands more from suicide, or murder by Russians, the Gestapo or SS). Suffering was disproportionate too, although this would be no solace to the sufferer. Nowhere in England did people resort to cannibalism, as they did in Leningrad, sometimes even before the victim was dead. Hastings emphasizes the cost of Britain's reluctance to risk men in battle; in Normandy, for example, it resulted in whole villages being destroyed by shells or bombs because of perhaps one sniper.

The problem with these concise histories is oversimplification and distortion. Britain did not abandon Poland in 1939, geography meant there was little it could do to help militarily. Britain went to war to defend a principle, and to deter Hitler. It failed but it was not ignoble. Hastings does not mention that Monty was not the first choice after Auchinleck was sacked (Gott was), and to state that British morale in the desert at the time was uniformly bad is simply not true—elite regiments like the Rifle Brigade, 11th Hussars and KRRC, for example, boasted demonstrably high morale, even during setbacks. Not all educated Indians were against India fighting, many joined up (but British concerns about their loyalty meant that more troops were in India to maintain order than fought the Japanese). I do not see that Churchill can be held responsible for 'Bomber' Harris's excesses, the misguided targeting of cities, because he did not sack him. Alanbrooke did not 'diminish his stature by condescension towards the Americans and stubborn enthusiasm for Mediterranean operations' despite making 'a notable contribution to Allied strategy between 1941 and 1943'. Alanbrooke was critical of Marshall in his diaries, but with justification—Marshall wanted to launch Overlord in 1942!—but he was courteous to his face, as he was to other Americans who lacked his mastery of strategy. And he did not overegg the Mediterranean pudding (despite the importance of the Suez Canal) but makes clear in his diaries that he regarded *all*

the campaigns as playing their part in defeating the Axis, something he felt the Americans did not grasp. Hastings's most notable omission is the defence of Calais before Dunkirk, what Churchill called 'the crux' without which 'all would have been cut off and lost'—if that is arguable, the defence was self-sacrifice at its most heroic and deserved mention.

Hastings reverses Correlli Barnett's view (*Desert generals*, Kimber, 1960) that El Alamein (October 1942) was unnecessary because the Torch Landings (November 1942) had doomed Axis forces anyway. Hastings points out that Allied momentum demanded a 'significant military gesture', and at El Alamein 'the British had achieved the only substantial land victory of the western war for which they shared laurels with no ally'. He quotes RAF Corporal Peter Baxter just after the American rout at Kasserine Pass (1943) in North Africa—that the Americans were not 'too sure what they're supposed to be fighting the Germans for'. This was apparent even in Normandy, where some GIs could not fathom the distinction between Hitler's Germany and Occupied France; it was all enemy territory, the people thus deemed hostile. They were issued with a booklet telling them why they were fighting and why the French might greet them less than ecstatically, after their house, orchard and possibly family had just been destroyed. If Hastings praises Patton, he also notes how his army, faced with German armour and battle-hardened troops, fared no better than other Allied units. In Normandy Allied casualties were akin to those on the Somme, casualties which appalled the West but not the Russians.

Hastings is good on the telling statistic or anecdote. A trainload of cats was sent to Leningrad in 1943 because all the city's cats had been eaten and there were none to combat the army of rats eating dead bodies. 300,000 Russian soldiers were shot by their own side. 100,000 women were forced into prostitution by the Japanese; only 8 per cent of slow Atlantic convoys and 4 per cent of fast convoys were attacked by U-boats—Germany did not have enough to win the Battle of the Atlantic. But while the telling quote can illustrate a point, it can also distort. He uses a dejected Italian soldier, Vittorio Vallicella, to describe Italian demoralization in the desert, and grotesque reading it makes of Italian incompetence, of officers bursting into tears, of disorderly retreat. But it is not the whole story. At Snipe, during El Alamein, Italian self-propelled guns advanced to their death against dug-in 6-pounder anti-tank guns of the 2nd Rifle Brigade. A diary of one of those brave Italians might tell a different story. Yet Hastings does attempt balance, quoting for example both those who found the war thrilling and fulfilling, like Peter Carrington and Churchill (who had 'the time of his life'), and those like Bernard Kops who found the London Blitz far from 'a time of a true communal spirit' but 'an era of utter terror, of fear and horror'; and a miserable midshipman on the Hood who pleads with his mother to write to the Admiralty to get him off the horrid, uncomfortable ship. He was too late.

Of the Holocaust, Hastings finds it inexplicable that the Nazis would divert 'scarce manpower and transport' to genocide. Recent research has shown that a tiny proportion of transport, rolling stock, was diverted; and nor was the manpower employed significant. But the explanation, like that of the 'blunder' of invading Russia, is politics. It was the purpose of Nazism to create *Lebensraum*, destroy Bolshevism and eliminate European Jewry, thus these were not seen as diversions of resources. Hastings describes the pervading anti-Semitism in both the British and US armies (the patrician Patton referred to Jews as being 'lower than animals') and the British Foreign Office, where one official moaned about 'wailing Jews' when commenting on a 1942 report about the death camps. This attitude led to almost wilful ignorance of Nazi genocide right up until 1945, atrocity stories being dismissed as lies. As Noel Annan of SIS said, even after they learnt of the gas ovens, they did not appreciate 'the scale ... that the figure of Jewish dead ran into millions'.

Hastings is ungenerous to those incomparably brave Germans of the Stauffenberg plot, who died wretchedly for their heroism. He writes: 'A legend of anti-Nazi resistance was created, and is today sustained, chiefly to bolster the revival of post-war German self-esteem'. Strangely he continues: 'Stauffenberg would almost certainly have been successful in killing Hitler had he remained in the Führer's HQ to detonate his bomb instead of hastening back to Berlin'. His meaning is unclear. Stauffenberg did prime the bomb and it exploded. Does he mean he should have blown himself up with it, thus depriving the resistance of its most dynamic leader? That the bomb did not kill Hitler was no fault of Stauffenberg's.

The author is more generous when it comes to acknowledging the Polish contribution to Ultra and decryption, sometimes overlooked, and that of Commander Rochefort at Arlington Hall, Virginia, as well as Turing and Welchman at Bletchley. These cryptanalysts' contribution to the war effort 'was greater than that of any other such small body of men in history'. I liked the story of the young code breaker, working in secret, who received a letter from his old headmaster saying he was a disgrace to the school as he wasn't in uniform.

Hastings does not retrace themes in detail which he has studied in other books, like the background to the dropping of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs (*Nemesis*, HarperPress, 2007), but has included a passage about Japan's refusal to face its past, partly the responsibility of America after the war, who urged that no modern history should be taught in school, leading to complete ignorance of the horrors their army perpetrated in China. And one Japanese lecturer told the author, 'I asked 50 students to list countries which have not fought Japan in modern times and 11 included America'. Japan, Hastings argues, 'bore overwhelming responsibility' for its own destruction by not 'bowing to logic [and] the welfare of their people by quitting the war'. Truman's mistake was not to deliver 'a specific ultimatum' before dropping the bombs.

The photographs in the book, which are familiar, are of soldiers and civilians, not generals or statesmen, as this is a book primarily about the experience of war for the many, not its direction by the few. A terrible experience for most, with lack of food (except in the United States) rather than bombs as the overriding memory, a carrot a luxury, marmalade an event. Four-fifths of Belgian children were found to have rickets in 1943. Mass migrations, sometimes for forced labour, wrenched people from their homes. There were compensations, a feeling of common purpose, of being 'in it together', without—as Hastings has commented—counselors on hand. Prostitution was rife. But in the end Hastings argues, like A. J. P. Taylor, that it was a good war, evil was defeated. And if the people, the soldier and civilian, muddled through to victory, Hastings praises one man, Churchill, whose madder schemes were checked by Alanbrooke, and who was 'the towering personality of the forces of light'.

Nicholas A. Bird

Europe

The US–EU security relationship: the tensions between a European and a global agenda. By Wyn Rees. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 2011. 224pp. Pb.: £24.99. ISBN 978 0 23022 185 7.

The end of the Cold War was a moment of triumph, but also one of uncertainty for the transatlantic partners. The bipolar balance, around which the European security architecture had been constructed, collapsed. With it, the very concepts with which one had come to understand international order and disorder were challenged. 'East' and 'West', the 'communist' and the 'free' world, were replaced by new constructs such as 'Pax Americana', 'BRICs'—and the European Union.

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the role of the United States in an EU context. Wyn Rees's new book helps fill in this gap. Rees has over time won a reputation as an authority on European security politics. His analysis comes across as even-handed and cool-headed in a field where scholars sometimes let their hopes guide their findings. Rees has taken it upon himself to write a straightforward syllabus account of the US–EU nexus. The book's primary mission is to give the student reader an introduction to the status quo, which it achieves admirably.

This is a book about the state of the Union after two decades of foreign policy integration. It is the most recent assessment of US policies towards the European Union, from the 1998 Saint Malo Declaration, which launched the EU's security and defence dimension, to the present. It may be worthwhile to stress this last point as a *caveat emptor*: the book's title gives an impression that it concerns itself with America and Europe in equal measure. It does not. This is a book about the European Union. The book can be said to have three primary aims: first, to explore EU–US security policy interaction with a particular focus on questions pertaining to the 'war on terror'; second, to examine the internal EU security policies, notably in terms of 'widening' (i.e. bringing in new members) and 'deepening' (the building of frameworks for Europe-wide security politics); and third, to assess how the tides of power and influence between member states, EU institutions and the United States help shape the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Rees claims to rely on a narrow, military definition of security (p. 11), but he soon reneges on this parsimonious pledge, for instance in treating EU enlargement policies as a case-study. This is a little dubious since enlargement is under the purview of the European Commission, and is generally not seen as a security policy in a narrow sense. Similarly, Rees shuns the extremes in the discourse (neo-Realism and social constructivism), but fails to spell out his own theoretical assumptions, which appears to be located somewhere within the broad confines of the English School.

The main strength of the book lies thus not in theoretical or methodological insights, but rather in explaining how Europe's security partnership with the United States has helped shape the multi-purpose, multidimensional, semi-supranational, semi-inter-governmental phenomenon that is the European Union. The book strikes an exemplary balance between the textbook's revisiting of known facts and genuinely insightful perspectives on the EU; to give one example: 'In Europe, unlike in the US, there has been no belief in the inherent goodness of the body politic' (p. 13). Indeed. The same cannot be said about the analysis of the United States, which comes across as a little easy—for instance, to stress 'exceptionalism' as a factor shaping US foreign policies is relevant, but the point can be overstated, not least in American dealings with Europe.

Rees examines EU security with an eye to what function security plays in the curiously disconnected EU and NATO enlargement processes. The inter-institutional relationship is famously uneasy. This is in part due to non-EU NATO members (Turkey) and non-NATO EU members (Cyprus), but the lack of institutional interpenetration is, as Rees correctly points out, also largely down to European states' seeing their interests better served by arm's length contact. Perhaps one might say that two institutions are *divided* by a shared set of *members*. A small flaw in the otherwise excellent chapter four is a failure to afford closer scrutiny of national positions in Europe, that is: why are European states engaging with the United States bilaterally and not as a collective?

Chapter six, perhaps the most interesting section of the book for those familiar with the subject-matter, deals with nuclear counter-proliferation efforts. These policies are often mentioned but seldom scrutinized in the literature on EU security. Rees brings genuinely

innovative sources and perspectives to reach his conclusion that the ‘good cop, bad cop’ double act of the EU and the US has been effective to some extent, but has also given proliferators an opportunity to exploit transatlantic divisions (p. 152). This leads into a discussion of homeland security cooperation, which highlights the book’s main theme, namely that the EU and the US are largely in concert regarding policy objectives but frequently differ on the means by which they are to be achieved.

Rees’s book sits well with recent writings on the EU, which tend to start from the assumption that the European Union is a partial political system, where institutions shape and guide intergovernmental bargains. The main shortfall in this well-written and well-researched book is a lack of emphasis on real-world outcomes. There is no chapter on the operational level, that is, the Common Security and Defence Policy missions around the world. I mention this because I suspect that there are a number of EU military missions that would—in the manner that they were carried out—go some way towards confirming Rees’s hypothesis that the EU has so far been unable to fill effectively the vacuum left by the creeping US withdrawal from European security. These minor criticisms apart, this is an excellent book, which will make a beneficial addition to European studies curriculums at both undergraduate and graduate levels.

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Cultures of border control: Schengen and the evolution of European frontiers. By Ruben Zaiotti. Chicago, IL, and London: University of Chicago Press. 2011. 280pp. Index. £58.00. ISBN 978 0 22697 786 7.

Immigration and conflict in Europe. By Rafaela M. Dancygier. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010. 368pp. Index. Pb.: £17.99. ISBN 978 0 52115 023 1.

Border control and conflicts over migration are key contemporary issues. The inflow of immigrants from Libya, Tunisia and Egypt earlier this year, the France–Italy spat and Denmark’s intent to re-establish border controls as well as the flaring up of right-wing populist sentiments in Europe are cases in point. The two books under review are thus very timely and their insights have been clearly missed in informing current debates. Both offer theoretically derived explanations: Ruben Zaiotti traces how collective European border control developed and Rafaela Dancygier addresses what causes immigrant conflict. Each book also challenges common assumptions and opens up new avenues for future research. Zaiotti takes on the intergovernmental reading of the development of Schengen and, instead, offers a cultural evolutionary framework that highlights how background assumptions and practices of border control changed via mechanisms of variation and selection. Dancygier, on the other hand, refutes the argument that ethnicity, religion or culture cause conflict, and instead outlines how the interplay of local economic scarcity and immigrants’ electoral power determines conflict. While common in some ways, the theoretical and methodological accounts show a stark contrast: Zaiotti uses a constructivist, cultural and pragmatist account, whereas Dancygier uses explanations from the toolbox of political economy and behaviouralism.

In *Cultures of border control*, Zaiotti explains how national border controls among participating states were abolished, allowing the free movement of people across borders as stipulated by the Schengen agreement, signed in 1985. However, since then the process towards its implementation has been marked by fluctuating support and political will among the signatories, as assumptions and practices of border control began to shift and evolve. For France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the Schengen regime has

been in effect since 1995. Its success shows in the inclusion of 18 additional members and the transition to the European Union with the Treaty of Maastricht, resulting in external borders now being 'de facto European borders, since their management is shared among EU governments and coordinated by an EU agency' (p. 219). The theoretical explanation suggests that the culture of national border control in the European governance systems was settled and uncontested, and only came under pressure when alternative governance systems and cultures were offered. This happened in the 1980s and 1990s when the idea of a European frontier instead of national borders offered a solution to collective problems that could not be satisfactorily tackled by one member state alone, such as migration and organized cross-border crime. Given that the alternative (a collective frontier) offered better performance for member states, the underpinning ideas, background assumptions and practices were institutionalized (in a process Zaiotti calls anchoring), which finally led to retention and acceptance of the new governance system and culture. Judging from a contemporary perspective, the aim of re-establishing border controls by Denmark in May 2011 challenged the 'Schengen culture', but the pressure not to do so by the other participants affirmed its prevalence.

Dancygier's *Immigration and conflict in Europe* covers new ground in offering a parsimonious explanation of sustained and often violent conflict involving immigrants. Two main variables, local economic scarcity and electoral power of immigrants, can lead to two different stages of conflict: conflict between immigrants and natives or conflict between immigrants and the state. In contrast to explanations based on ethnicity, culture or religion, Dancygier's research findings show that conflict only occurs if immigrants and 'natives' compete for scarce resources at the local level. The higher the immigrant population, the more strain is on resources such as housing or state-provided accommodation, employment, education and social welfare. Second, she shows that if immigrants have no electoral power to make their voice heard, immigrant-state conflict occurs. On the other hand, if a locally dense immigrant population gains political power via the election of their own representatives or by gaining support from one party, the indigenous population often aims to fight back against the redistribution of scarce resources towards immigrants, leading to immigrant-native conflict. In compiling a vast amount of statistical information on immigrants, researching archival holdings about conflict in two London boroughs and two Midland cities as well as newspaper articles and expert interviews, this book compresses an enormous amount of information covering the period from 1950 to 2008. It is placed in the rational, political economy and methodologically 'positivist' research tradition, employing a range of qualitative and quantitative methods and meticulously establishing linkages at the local level to connect to the nationwide phenomenon of immigrant conflict in Great Britain. However, to increase reliability it goes further, discussing the case of Germany in one chapter and the remaining European countries in another concluding chapter. Given the density of the information presented, but aggregating it with only two main variables, a discussion of the limitations is missing. For example, only conflicts that appeared in the British newspapers *The Times* or the *Guardian* are counted as instances of large-scale violence, leaving one wondering if the results would be different if the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sun* had been used.

Both books make an important contribution to their field and internal security more generally that is too often neglected by scholars of International Relations and comparative politics. Each author offers a clear line of argument and systematically adds knowledge towards, respectively, a theory of border control and immigrant conflict in Europe. And each pushes back the research frontier and opens multiple avenues for future research. For research inspired by Zaiotti this might well include exploring the implications of the 'Schengen culture' for the wider European enterprise and European security in detail. On

the other hand, immigrant conflict is not confined to Europe, but is also an important topic in the United States or the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries with high immigrant populations.

Neither account can be done justice in a brief review. The purchase of and engagement with each of the books will be a highly rewarding and intellectually stimulating experience and will reveal to the reader the enthusiasm and dedication with which both authors have researched and presented their topic. Both books are a must-read, ideally in conjunction, for political scientists, historians or sociologists working on border control, internal security, immigration or causes of conflict, and are equally recommended to policy-makers and politicians.

Hubertus Jürgenliemk, University of Cambridge, UK

Les diplomates: derrière la façade des ambassades de France. By Franck Renaud. Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions. 2010. 394pp. Index. €21.00. ISBN 978 2 84736 518 4. [The diplomats: behind the facade of France's embassies.]

At the beginning of 2009, France, with its 160 bilateral embassies and about 16,000 full-time foreign ministry employees, had the world's second-largest diplomatic network, after the United States, which had 165 bilateral embassies. Franck Renaud's close look at the French diplomatic service blends serious research with many interesting, amusing and unpleasant stories, usually footnoted, although frequently only described as confidential interviews. The author covers in eight chapters the main activities and challenges facing French diplomats, sprinkling them occasionally with stories of diplomatic slip-ups.

Les diplomates was published just before Michèle Alliot-Marie became briefly the first ever female foreign minister of France, though the author's critical gender research of the ministry is still valid—France never had a female ambassador in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy, Russia, the United States, Japan, India or China, although the number of female ambassadors increased from one in 1972 to about 20 in 2009. The author describes precisely and dispassionately the unusual case of Salome Zourabichvili, the French ambassador to Georgia who changed sides to become the host country's foreign minister, but he does not analyse potential security implications, or the general security awareness of the French diplomatic community and their democratically elected masters and supervisors. This lack of awareness is particularly evident in the chapter on intelligence- and security-related diplomatic challenges. Renaud is very good as a watcher of the careers and activities of the heads of the French civilian intelligence service DGSE, but is more complimentary about their less politicized military counterparts. The sub-chapter dedicated to French diplomacy in China would probably merit another book in itself, and should worry foreign policy managers, task masters and observers in Paris.

Eleven pages devoted to paedophile diplomats present the most troubling part of the book and, if the author is right, the most shocking aspect is that the problem is swept under the thick carpet of political and personal excuses.

The French global cultural campaign is covered selectively—Renaud ignores the French cultural campaign in the developed countries—but his description of the 'competition' between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Employment, although short, is to the point. The privatization, known in French administrative jargon as 'externalization' of the visa services and its implementation in China, is a perfect example of how things should not be done, and could be a timely warning to any foreign ministry contemplating such a move.

The chapter 'Corruption: the big and small cases' is mainly about misuse and abuse of power and privileges, although the French version of the 'food for oil' scandal is well described. The issue of official and diplomatic tourism will have every reader with diplomatic experience smiling, although French officials appear to be particularly carefree with taxpayers' money and the time of their diplomats when visiting foreign countries. French ambassadors are well paid—the chapter on French diplomatic salaries is well documented—but not appreciated by their political masters. President Chirac said in 2002 that two-thirds of French ambassadors were 'incapables', and President Sarkozy was reported to declare that French ambassadors were even more stupid than prefects, the chief administrative officials of France's departments.

Renaud is especially good at a slightly jaundiced 'who is who and why' of the French diplomatic service. His statistics are interesting and, when not hidden behind 'Author's interview', the sources are reliable.

The book includes four maps showing the French diplomatic posts around the world, a list of French embassies and their grading, wire diagrams of the French embassies in Brazil and Vietnam, two good indexes (geographical and personal) and a list of residence allowances of French ambassadors. Students and observers of the French foreign policy and diplomacy should not miss *Les diplomates*.

Henry Plater-Zyberk, Prague Security Studies Institute, Czech Republic

Civic and uncivic values: Serbia in the post-Milosevic era. Edited by Ola Listhaug, Sabrina P. Ramet and Dragana Dulic. Budapest and New York: CEU Press. 2011. 468pp. Index. £40.00. ISBN 978 9 63977 698 2.

Civic and uncivic values, rather original in its approach, is concerned with the democratic transition of the former Yugoslavia, and specifically dedicated to value transformation and democratization processes in Serbia after Milosevic. Primarily focusing on the system of values and its influence on both the performance of the political system and societal developments and discourse in present-day Serbia, the contributors to this volume demonstrate how traditional, provincial and nationalist values, referred to as *uncivic*, still obstruct the European aspirations of the biggest republic of the former Yugoslavia. In that respect, the authors adopt an analytical approach to examine the impact of civic and uncivic values in a variety of Serbian societal and political contexts. Thus the volume addresses both traditional (conventionally Orthodox and chiefly nationalist) values and their civic counterparts in historical perspective on the one hand, but also more contemporary settings of post-Milosevic Serbia on the other. The contributors' arguments evolve around the notion of values as primary and essential per se, thus asserting claims that any Serbian progress towards membership of the European Union is tied to value transformation, which inherently preconditions all other societal and political changes and dynamics. Therefore, as the authors show by addressing a number of different contexts (media, films, schools, gender, nationalism and the issue of Kosovo), any related change in Serbia is directly associated with value transformation and may not be envisaged without it. By taking this analytical stand, the contributors to this volume succeed in explaining and exemplifying the enormous influence that predominantly *uncivic* values still possess in shaping the country's political system and society alike.

The contributors, of different academic backgrounds, also succeed in arguing their cases, presenting an analysis wide in its scope, effective in its performance and interesting to read. The volume is well written, with some minor misspellings of names of Serbian

politicians and public figures. Hopefully, this issue should not offend any reader, and does not upset the flow of the volume's plausible arguments. Having quite a narrative quality to it, it seems reasonable to assume that the book will be of interest to an audience beyond just academia. I most warmly recommend this volume as an extremely useful and engaging addition to the literature in the field.

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Russia and Eurasia

Popular support for an undemocratic regime: the changing views of Russians. By **Richard Rose, William Mishler and Neil Munro.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2011. 206pp. Index. Pb.: £18.99. ISBN 978 0 52122 418 5.

If Vladimir Putin is so bad, how come he is so popular? That, in paraphrase, is the question at the heart of a fascinating, if somewhat slight, book. In 175 pages of analysis, the authors provide a welcome realignment of perception for western readers seeking to understand this apparent paradox of contemporary Russia. Drawing on almost two decades of their New Russia Barometer surveys at the University of Aberdeen, they have to hand a unique resource with which to discern the development of Russians' views of Russia and its leaders. Richard Rose, William Mishler and Neil Munro argue that it is a particular form of western ethnocentrism to presume that people will only support a political system that is just like our own (p. 12). The first New Russia Barometer Survey was conducted in 1992, in the immediate aftermath of the stunningly peaceful and swift move from Communist Party dictatorship to a nascent democracy under the then heroic figure of President Yeltsin. The eighteenth survey took place in 2009, not long after a democratically flawed transfer of power, or at least of position, from President Putin to President Medvedev. Between the first and the latest surveys, the proportion of Russian citizens supporting the governing regime apparently rose from around 15 per cent to over 75 per cent (p. 103).

Such support on the part of Russians stems neither from a passive acceptance of the only realistic option before them, nor from their being bought off by improvements in economic performance. Indeed, the authors argue that such a pocketbook explanation can be 'conclusively rejected' (p. 101). They demonstrate that the most important political performance measure is the rating of the president. Even such a finding, however, does not sit as easily as might be supposed with the standard western notion that the Russian people have broadly approved of Putin, both as president and as prime minister in tandem with President Medvedev, because they are more eager than most for a 'firm hand' leader. What repeated opinion surveys actually show is steady majority support for democracy, unaltered over two decades.

Russia's citizens are not so blind as to believe that they are living in such a democracy, but their point of comparison, and hence their source of relative satisfaction, is not an idealized consolidated western democracy, but rather the Soviet era. A clear majority believes that the parliamentary elections in December 2007 were 'more or less fair'; the democratic legitimacy of the ruling regime remains far more intact at home, with little buy-in to the more negative assessments of international election observers (p. 135). Perhaps as a result of being a multi-authored work, *Popular support for an undemocratic regime* tacks a little between understanding Russia from the Russian perspective and occasionally taking a less nuanced position—at one point claiming, despite the temporal and empirical difficulties of such a

claim, that 'authoritarian' Russia served as an example for the post-Soviet dictatorships in Central Asia or Belarus (p. 167). Such terminological slippage, from undemocratic to authoritarian to dictatorial, confuses the argument a little.

Alongside the question of why support remains high for an undemocratic regime, a secondary question running through the book concerns stability. Using survey data from 98 countries, the authors show that there is no statistically significant relationship between whether a regime is 'free or unfree' and the durability of that regime. What matters is popular support (p. 173). Based on this conclusion, the authors appear to forecast, in their last sentence, the longevity of Russia's current ruling regime. They may well be right, but two nagging thoughts remain. First, the Soviet collapse arrived with an unforeseen rapidity, only months after a referendum showed substantial support for the state's continued existence. Second, it is not yet clear whether what we see in Russia is broad support for the regime or for Vladimir Putin personally. The surveys cited in this tantalizing book note a gap between support for Putin personally and for the regime (p. 125). They note too a growing dissatisfaction with the gap between Russians' genuine preference for democracy and the undemocratic system in which they live (p. 121). As the book's subtitle emphasizes, the views of Russians are changing. Any forecast of stability in our changeable, regime-shaking world does well to hedge itself with such a subtitled caveat.

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Middle East and North Africa

The Arab revolution: ten lessons from the democratic uprising. By Jean-Pierre Filiu.

London: Hurst. 2011. 256pp. Index. Pb.: £12.99. ISBN 978 1 84904 159 0.

It is hard to put into words the enormity of the events that have occurred across the Arab world in 2011. At the time of writing, Mubarak, Qadhafi and Ben Ali have been unseated from power, Saleh of Yemen and Assad of Syria are on the brink, all other Arab leaders watch on with varying degrees of nervousness. These rapidly evolving events of historical proportions have not only dominated the global news headlines but have forced scholars into auditing the region anew. Jean-Pierre Filiu's book is timely to say the least, offering a short but concise series of historical perspectives and modern analysis to form ten lessons from what he terms the 'democratic uprising'.

The fundamentals of the revolution are a call for comprehensive justice, a democratic renaissance characterized by a demand for dignity, pride and honour. Filiu passionately describes the 'struggle for self-determination, for liberation from a corrupt clique, for regaining control and power over a nation's and the individual's destiny'. The struggle is widely accepted to have originated with the suicide protest of 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi, who was 'not emulating the suicide commandos of Islamist groups' but rather echoing the Czech student Jan Palach, who committed suicide through self-immolation, offering his own life to protest the Soviet invasion. At least seven Egyptians tried to follow Bouazizi's example and set themselves on fire in public prior to the fall of Mubarak. Bouazizi now has a square in Tunis, which had been named to commemorate Ben Ali's accession to power, named after him.

Many of Filiu's chapters are based on debates that have come to dominate study of the region, which is seen in a new light in the context of the Arab revolutions. These include an examination of the myth of Arab exceptionalism and the tragically misguided post-9/11 search for answers to Al-Qaeda's motives in the Qur'an. Arabs are no exception,

their predicament was not due to their being the 'quintessential other' but rather for 'the resilience of their ruling cliques', a resilience that has now been shattered.

Filiu admits that if there is to be an Arab exception it concerns its demographic makeup. It is worth remembering that the median age of the Arab world is 22 (compared with 28 worldwide) and that 60 per cent of the Arab population is less than 25 years of age. Arab youth unemployment ranges from 20 to 40 per cent, twice the world average. Filiu is spot on when he remarks on the 'mind boggling' reality that 50 million jobs are needed by 2020 to fully absorb young people coming into the labour market in the Arab world. Although the book's length means it must inevitably leave out certain details, references to economic points such as the impact of rising food prices would have given a more comprehensive picture of the factors at play. World Bank president Robert Zoellick, for example, has said that food prices have risen by almost 30 per cent in the past year, with an estimated 44 million people worldwide being pushed into poverty by soaring commodity costs.

The youth 'demographic issue' is compounded by the emergence of satellite channels and internet social media sites, with Al-Jazeera, Facebook and Twitter all bringing the tools of globalization to millions of new users. Filiu colourfully describes the youth anger, saying 'their power and their rage could be the energy of the future'. He goes on to sum up in magisterial prose the actions of the youth as 'the ultimate reaction of defence by the most exposed generation against the sterilization of its aspirations, the privatization of its nation-state and the obliteration of its future'.

Technology inspired the emergence of the 'leaderless revolution', with the uprising in Tunisia characterized by 'no central planning and no operation room'. A leaderless revolution is described as 'not only a political choice but also a condition for survival'. However, Filiu, while saluting the leaderless revolutionaries, is guilty of falling into contradiction when describing Al-Qaeda's irrelevance as a consequence of it being 'speechless and leaderless'. More important is that Al-Qaeda has been shown up by the revolutions to be ideologically bankrupt, an 'aberration' that is both 'disconnected' and 'alienated' from Arab realities.

The internet is described as being situated 'at a fascinating juncture between the public and the private sphere'. The murder by police of cyber-militant Khaled Said in 2010 became both a symbol and a rallying point for this new arena of protest and dissent after being broadcast and going viral online. However, Filiu urges against getting carried away with the notion that social networks are always a central driver of revolution, with a skilful placing of users of Twitter into events that were also determined by the more old-fashioned techniques of mass protest and civil disobedience.

The revolutions symbolize in Filiu's mind a 'unique way to get out of the patriarchal mould' of the Arab regime. The protesters are both fed up with the ruling elite and in no mood to replace it with something similar. Islamists, often seen as the natural alternative to fill the vacuum left by the fall of authoritarian leaders, are also challenged by the new era ushered in by the revolutions. Although both prior to and during many of the uprisings religious places were used as meeting points, this was more a reflection of the realities that most other spaces were under close internal surveillance. Filiu reassures worried observers of western news coverage that shouting 'Allah-u-akbar' during moments of collective excitement is 'not proof of religious fervour' and is much like a football fans' chant.

The book touches only briefly on the role of external international actors. Filiu is scathing of Washington, bemoaning that 'after decades of American support for the autocrats, mere benign neglect by the US is already perceived as a relief'. The book is also largely focused on Tunisia and Egypt, with events having moved so quickly that Filiu is not up to date enough to cover Qadhafi's fall. This means that Libya is used to highlight

the limits of grassroots dynamics to an armed insurgency, a shortfall that in reality NATO airpower and over 20,000 sorties helped to correct. Backed by a strong set of appendices, Filiu's short but concise work is an important introduction to what is sure to be an expansive debate aimed at understanding the Arab revolutions.

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Iran, the Green Movement and the USA: the fox and the paradox. By Hamid Dabashi. London: Zed Books. 2010. 192pp. Pb.: £14.99. ISBN 978 1 84813 816 2.

The Middle East has a rich tradition of parables and proverbs drawn from the mysteries of the animal kingdom. In *Iran, the Green Movement and the USA*, Hamid Dabashi uses a sequence of Persian animal fables to frame his thinking about the region. Yet the author's animal tales merely exist to enliven an otherwise predictable and intemperate ideological screed. The *dramatis personae* in Dabashi's fable of a 'faraway jungle' consist of the once mighty lion king, the deceitful fox and the foolish donkey. Through a combination of flattery and veiled insults, the fox persuades the dying lion to hunt the donkey—only to devour the prime cuts before the poor lion can. The faltering lion king supposedly represents the United States, the Middle East's waning hegemon. The Iranian regime, meanwhile, is the clever fox, whose regional adversaries, Saddam in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan, have been conveniently eliminated by the United States. The donkey, finally, is the prize in their contest: regional supremacy. (Later on, we meet a 'self-righteous and conniving turtle'—the Jewish state—who seeks to eat the Middle East's heart.)

On one level, then, Dabashi's text merely restates the conventional narrative holding that, by dislodging the Ba'athist regime and the Talibs, the Bush administration unleashed a hitherto contained Iran to America's own detriment. Dabashi's telling, however, is distinguished by his insistence on compacting as many post-9/11 clichés as might fit in the book's pages. The author expends much ink decrying the supposed 'degeneration of the U.S. into a nativist militarism' and the 'imperial hubris that seems to be constitutive of the DNA of [American] political culture'. The true villains in Dabashi's own fable, it seems, are not the brutal Iranian theocrats but the shadowy 'neocons', beholden to their dark guru Leo Strauss and residing in think-tanks such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The author sees no need to address contemporary neo-conservatism's central tenets; merely mentioning these ominous terms and figures, Dabashi seems to suspect, suffices to win the day among his audience.

At times, Dabashi's rhetoric and tone create comical effects, as when he accuses a number of influential expatriate scholars and activists of Arab and Iranian descent of 'providing Psy-Op scholarship' to the neo-conservative apparatus. Without a hint of irony, Dabashi also rues the fact that Barack Obama graduated from Columbia University just as he assumed his professorship there, 'so [Dabashi] never had the opportunity to teach him anything'. To his great misfortune, Obama is now beyond Dabashi's reach, 'guarded by conventional wisdoms of might and empire'. The author's venomous anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism, however, lead to some truly ugly formulations, as when he speaks of a 'Zionist tribalism', or concludes that, in the aftermath of 9/11, 'a Christian empire (aided and abetted by a Jewish state) ... invaded and conquered Muslim lands'. The author repeatedly identifies Islamist terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah as 'national liberation movements', and draws moral parallels between Israel, a liberal democracy, and an Iranian dictatorship he rightly diagnoses as fascist: 'The calamitous degeneration of the Iranian revolution of 1979 ... mirrored the Jewish state'.

None of this should surprise those familiar with the trajectory of Dabashi's career. Long before the emergence of the Green Movement in the aftermath of Iran's disputed 2009 presidential election, Dabashi had established himself as an anti-western and anti-Israel firebrand. He was briefly thrust into the national spotlight when, in a 2004 column in the newspaper *al-Ahram*, he accused Israelis of suffering from a 'vulgarity of character that is bone-deep and structural to the skeletal vertebrae of [their] culture'. (In a subsequent letter to the *Columbia Spectator*, Dabashi apologized for his hurtful words, but clarified that 'that passage could have easily been written about ... Apartheid South Africa, Nazi Germany, ... the Americans in Iraq, or the Janjaweed in Darfur'—thus in one fell swoop equating Israel and the United States with some of the twentieth century's most despicable regimes.)

Once the Greens burst onto the scene and the Iranian regime's vicious crackdown captured international headlines, Dabashi sought to rebrand himself as one of the movement's chief spokespersons in the West, even briefly hosting a Green-themed, Persian-language online television show called 'This week in green'—a transformation that surprised many in the Iranian-American community who recalled his frequently hosting the regime's ambassador to the United Nations at Columbia University, prior to summer 2009. *Iran, the Green Movement and the USA* is an extension of Dabashi's new-found Green advocacy. Yet, in a book ostensibly devoted to a pro-democracy movement with liberal underpinnings, the extent to which Dabashi views the region's geopolitical and moral battles through the mullahs' eyes is remarkable. The Greens, too, in Dabashi's reading, are, or should ultimately be, a thorn in the side of the United States and its allies in the region. But recall that, on 'Quds Day', the Iranian regime's annual anti-Israel holiday, young Iranians have braved jail and worse to chant 'not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life only for Iran!'—a clear indication that, Dabashi's protests notwithstanding, enmity towards the West and the Jewish state did not top the Green agenda while the movement was in its heyday; that Iranian dissidents do not fit the author's militant, 'subaltern' mould. Sometimes, a fable is just that—even in the Middle East.

Sohrab Ahmari

The other side of the mirror: an American travels through Syria. By Brooke Allen. Philadelphia, PA: Paul Dry Books. 2011. 259pp. \$16.95. ISBN 978 1 58988 068 9.

Brooke Allen, an American critical writer, attempts in this book the ambitious task of writing a travelogue that opens up the closed state of Syria to an American public. Sadly, what Allen has created is a fragmented, superficial and deeply flawed foray into Syria that, considering the great potential of the task, is disappointing.

Although featuring sections of history and political commentary, the book reads much like a holiday diary. Much of the 248-page work comprises chunks of quotations, ranging from Mark Twain to T. E. Lawrence, and a number of postcard-like pictures of Syria's greatest tourist attractions. What's more, the Syria that Allen describes is almost completely devoid of real characters. With no Arabic language skills to enable her to converse with Syrian people, the majority of the author's encounters are with workers in the tourist trade. Allen admits to having 'untutored eyes', and one wonders how much you can really learn from an author whose book is seemingly based on only two short trips to the country.

Allen has chosen a thematic structure to examine Syria through frameworks such as time, faith and ruins. She admits that the book is a 'series of traveller's impressions', but the structure means that the reader is taken from one corner of the country to another in a matter of paragraphs and, crucially, the sense of travel is entirely lost. That said, the author

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has obviously read extensively around the subject and the book includes some strong sections on the historical context of Syria's many magnificent Crusader castles.

Allen is, however, perhaps the most innocent of innocents abroad, setting out in the early chapters the stark dichotomy between the Syria she believes that Americans perceive and the actual experience. This leads to bold statements such as 'most Westerners are under the impression that Syrians are fanatically Muslim', and you feel that perhaps only a westerner with no knowledge of Syria at all can be the proper judge of the work. At several points in the book, Allen expresses her surprise that Syrians are not instantly hostile to her and you feel that after her trips she has undergone only a transition from absolute to relative ignorance. Many sections of the book are also deeply patronizing, such as the author's lazy referral to her drivers as Muhammed one, two, three and four, and the constant highlighting of translation and spelling errors on English-language restaurant menus.

Having lived in Syria around the time Allen was writing, I did not recognize much of the book's description of the country. While some mistakes, such as thinking that there are no ATMs in Syria, are forgivable, much less so is Allen's rose-tinted conclusion that living in the police state is not as bad as people might think. The 2011 uprisings and the brutal attempts to put them down have made the timing of Allen's book somewhat tragic, as Syria's emerging US\$5 billion tourist industry has more or less collapsed. The author is surprised by the 'genuine enthusiasm' for their dictatorial leader and later argues that 'Syrians seem to have developed a far more civil and polite public arena than our own'. While Allen wrote the book prior to the March 2011 outbreak of protests her stance that the 'jury is still out' on Assad is very much out of date as today the majority of the world has made the decision that he must go.

Allen's whistle-stop foray into the history, culture and politics of Syria contains nuggets of interest but ultimately falls wide of the mark, leaving an unfilled space for a heavyweight account of travels from this currently tortured country.

James Denselow, King's College London, UK

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Season of rains: Africa in the world. By Stephen Ellis. London: Hurst. 2011. 209pp. £16.99. ISBN 978 1 84904 109 6.

Prompted by a lecture to officials in the Netherlands' foreign ministry, *Season of rains* brilliantly succeeds in its goal of providing a succinct introduction to a continent which is still all too often conceived by external observers in stereotypes inherited from the post-colonial period, or indeed much further back in the history of 'the dark continent'. Especially since the end of the Cold War, or perhaps still more important since the appearance of the mobile phone, most of Africa is now far removed from the pictures both of wild animals and of starving children that continue to provide the overwhelming weight of coverage on western television screens. The central message of the book is that it is long past time for a decolonization of the western mind—and especially the minds of diplomats and aid officials, for whom this should be a compulsory text—from preconceptions of the continent as a backward zone in constant need of firm but sympathetic moral guidance by richer and more 'developed' powers.

Ellis starts by noting that Africa, far from being 'left out' of a burgeoning process of globalization, is in fact intimately and intricately incorporated into the modern world. A brief snapshot of a pre-colonial trader, Jaja of Bonny in what is now south-eastern Nigeria,

reminds us that this incorporation is no recent phenomenon, but part of a continuum in which 'oil bunkering' (selling stolen oil on the global market), aid and the activities of non-governmental organizations, the narcotics trade, and the desperate attempts by many Africans to reach parts of the world that offer them greater opportunities than they can find at home are all integral elements. Africa is now likewise closely linked into global financial markets, from massive levels of capital flight on the one hand through to the remittance economy on the other, without which human life in places such as Somalia would be barely sustainable.

Season of rains will make uncomfortable reading especially for the aid industry, not least for governments in the United Kingdom, both Labour and coalition, which have treated Africa essentially as a convenient shorthand for demonstrating their humanity and concern for the benefit of domestic voters. In practice, and regardless of the often admirable motivations of those who promote it, aid both public and private helps to uphold all manner of dependency-inducing practices. A brilliant paragraph (pp. 36–7) dissects the regime of Paul Kagame in Rwanda, and his ability to exploit western guilt over the 1994 genocide, while brushing off critiques of his own less than admirable activities both at home and especially in neighbouring Congo; there is a reference to the 'hapless' Clare Short, though not (oddly, or perhaps just charitably) to the still more bizarre relationship between Kagame and the current UK coalition government.

Ellis's touch is perhaps just a little less sure when he gets to domestic politics. He readily debunks 'dependency' and 'neo-colonial' stereotypes, which blame all of Africa's ills on corporations and colonialists, and also the Great Man/Really Awful Man approach that blames them on the Mobutus and Mugabes who have come to represent the evils of African governance to the outside world, plausibly arguing that all leaders are constrained by the norms of their own societies. But what those norms are, and how they constrain—or indeed fail to constrain—the actions of individuals, could have been usefully explored. Why, for example, does the intense spirituality of many Africans, by no means restricted to 'traditional' religious mores but extending into the fervent adoption of externally introduced faiths, apparently fail to exert moral pressure on rulers' behaviour? And if, plausibly, we ascribe many of Africa's evident problems to the peculiar and often pernicious relationship between deeply entrenched cultural values and the impact of the outside world, what room does that leave for significant (and beneficent) change? While it is clear enough from Ellis's argument that attempts to change Africa from outside are almost entirely futile, it is far from clear whether there is any basis for a dynamic emanating from within. In this context, it is not only the western mindset on Africa that needs to be decolonized, but also the African one: the grand project of Africa's intellectual elite has overwhelmingly been to evade responsibility for the problems of African development, rather than to devise means (other than a jejune revolutionary socialism) through which they might be overcome. The lesson both of Asia and of Latin America is that the path to change begins in the minds of its indigenous thinkers.

Christopher Clapham, University of Cambridge, UK

Inventing Africa: history, archaeology and ideas. By Robin Derricourt. London: Pluto. 2011. 183pp. Index. Pb.: £17.99. ISBN 978 0 74533 105 8.

This is an ambitious book, as indeed the title makes plain. Robin Derricourt has brought together a series of papers on the changing perceptions of Africa, which provide the background to the ways in which the world engages with the continent. He argues in an

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intriguing last chapter, 'The present of the past', that we continue today to see Africa not as what it is but as what we imagine it to be. *Inventing Africa* is what we do when we think about a continent that remains an enigma. The question is, therefore, why we think as we do. The author acknowledges the pitfalls of his approach but he believes that, now as before, we are prey to a number of myths about Africa, which make it difficult to overcome an image of the continent that suits our needs rather than reflects the 'realities' on the ground.

However, the structure and contents of the book are puzzling. The title and subtitles of the various chapters seem to indicate a historical approach to the question ('Mythic and mystic Africa'; 'Egos and fossils'; 'Ancient Egypt and African sources of civilisation'). Yet the fact that Derricourt concludes the book with little reference to the historical context within which the questions arise leaves the reader with the impression that history does not much matter. Nor do 'ideas', come to think of it. The emphasis is on the use and abuse of archaeology in the search for the significance of the data thus uncovered. Derricourt himself explains that the chapters can be read independently and in any order, thus making it clear that he sees the book more as a compilation of some of the key archaeological 'discoveries' about Africa than as an argument about the more plausible interpretations of that past. Since much of the material is drawn from the changing South African 'vision' of Africa, the book is also largely a review of archaeology in that part of the continent where the Europeans met the Africans and settled in their domain. This is an interesting discussion but it does confine the review of the literature very largely to those who lived and worked in South Africa.

The author's implicit argument is that our perceptions of the past provide the context within which we need to review our present 'invention' of Africa. But this is what he does not do. It is as though we are locked into a vision of the continent that does not, and will not, change: as though the complex history of the ways in which both Europeans and Africans have responded to the archaeology of the continent did not matter. But we know that the debate about such important archaeological finds as the Great Zimbabwe has been influenced by the politics of the 'present'. It is thus odd to be told that the archaeology of that great city will continue to matter, not according to the demands of the present but in terms of the progress that further research may uncover. That such should be the book's argument is due to two main factors: one is that the author writes as an archaeologist and not as a historian; the other is that he neglects to take into account that history is always a matter of perception and not merely an accumulation of solid 'facts'.

This volume will serve as a handy reference book about the archaeology of Africa but it does not achieve what it proposes to do, namely to link the historical context with the ideas that we form about the continent. The book, therefore, is less than the sum total of the hard information it provides. We, the readers, will easily get lost in the intricate detail of the South African career of Raymond Dart in the evolving archaeology of the South African material, without making the link with the changing historical context of the times both in South Africa and elsewhere in the colonial world. In short, this is a useful compilation of the author's research papers but the gaps between the chapters are alarmingly wide and do not seem to address the key question of why our perception of Africa is stuck, as it were, in our own vision of the 'dark' continent.

Patrick Chabal, King's College London, UK

South Africa pushed to the limit: the political economy of change. By Hein Marais.

London: Zed Books. 2011. 566pp. Index. Pb.: £25.00. ISBN 978 1 84813 859 9.

This updated and expanded edition of Hein Marais's influential 1998 book (*South Africa: limits to change: the political economy of change*, Zed Books) provides a critique of post-apartheid South Africa from the political left. Marais records the 'disorientation and disillusionment ... of South African progressives' due to both the performance of the ANC in office and the collapse of the USSR and loss of belief in 'overly state centric', commandist models of development. Amidst this ideological confusion, idealists like Marais have shifted their hopes to 'the new social and protest movements'.

Unchanged is Marais's hostility to liberalism, despite the fact that he now accepts values such as constitutional democracy, independent judicial and other institutions, and meritocratic Weberian models of governance. The main theme of his book is that the ANC's deviation from its historic task of 'radically transforming' South Africa is due to the influence of liberals and of the domestic and international capitalists, whom he assumes liberals control. The ANC's concern to appease them led to policies aimed at 'salvaging SA capitalism' (pp. 70, 78), while providing sops for the masses in the form of welfare grants, tightened labour legislation and affirmative action to promote black advance.

Marais identifies three other factors that have 'disoriented' progressives. First, their shock at some aspects of mass behaviour, exemplified by the self-serving, violent actions in some mass protests. Second, the social conservatism of the masses, evident in attitudes to the death penalty, gender issues and xenophobia. In other words, signs of the often nasty, anti-social and selfish behaviour for which he excoriates the bourgeoisie and from which 'the committed political elites and enthusiastic civil society activists' (p. 355) on whom his hopes rest are not immune—evident in the ease with which many of them were 'coopted' by the ANC, and the swift use they then made of opportunities for self-enrichment. Third, the political left is dismayed by the growth of militant black nationalism, having anticipated that political polarization would take place along class, not racial, lines. Marais is also disturbed by the continued high level of electoral support for the ANC, despite popular dissatisfaction with increasing corruption and often appalling service delivery.

The author's hostility to liberalism has deep historical roots, which have been reinforced by the advent of 'neo-liberalism'—a misleading term that brushes over the fact that liberalism, like communism, nationalism and conservatism, has many faces. Historically, major features of South African liberalism included not only anti-racism and championing the rule of law but campaigning for anti-poverty policies. This 'soft' liberal tradition is evident in the support of the former Liberal Party for redistribution of land and 'a more just distribution of income'. South African liberals have failed to get across these truths about their historical record in the face of their demonization by the South African Communist Party. This bitter historical feud continues to hamper cooperation between these groups, which now have more in common, based on the growing support of many Marxists/progressives for many 'bourgeois' liberal values, and the growing recognition by many liberals of the limits of supposedly free (though often politically rigged) markets and the need to secure a more level playing field, if competitive forces are to function fairly in a society with such a grossly skewed economic inheritance.

But Marais's lengthy, uneven book is not just agitprop aimed at an in-group of activists. It contains some useful information and insightful analysis. The chapters on education and health document the worrying paradox that, despite high expenditure, South Africa's performance is worse than that of many poorer African countries. But these chapters

soon lapse back into conformity with the main ideological thesis. Thus, in discussing the campaign for a basic income grant, Marais omits reference to the fact that this policy is supported by the official liberal opposition, the Democratic Alliance. Likewise, when discussing the origins of the ANC's welfare policies, Marais omits to mention that these policies were originally introduced by liberals, such as Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr and Max Gluckman, during their sole period of office in the wartime government of Jan Smuts. And in discussing the ANC's disastrous experiment in Outcomes Based Education, Marais refrains from identifying the ardent progressives who promoted this fashionable policy, instead blaming (p. 331) 'neoliberal rationality'—though this policy was hardly supported by such educational traditionalists.

There is little recognition by Marais of the important role played by white liberals, Afrikaner verligtes and business in ending apartheid. But he raises important questions about the role of capital in post-apartheid South Africa; in particular, whether 'capital' (referred to as though it were one entity, with the capacity to act as such) reneged on the 'deal' made with the ANC that secured South Africa's 1994 transition to majority rule. Part of this deal was supposedly the easing of exchange controls over the mobility of capital (restricted by both the Afrikaner Nationalist government and by economic sanctions) in exchange for future inflows of investment to fuel economic growth. Marais maintains that the ANC delivered on its part of the deal, leading to the removal from South Africa of significant assets by many of its leading companies—which then failed to reciprocate by investing in the post-apartheid economy.

Marais does not set out his alternative 'mode of production' to the liberal capitalism he denounces and the 'state centric' policies with which he is disillusioned. It is unclear how his 'solidarity economy' (p. 346) would work and how his call for 'the wider realisation of social rights' (p. 193) would be financed, especially as, despite mass unemployment, Marais remains committed to large-scale, capital-intensive production, dismissing the labour-intensive strategies involved in small-medium production, including in agriculture and public works programmes. Marais scorns this inferior '2nd economy'. In relation to the well-documented uncompetitiveness of South African labour, the author supports the position of the trade union federation, Cosatu, that only 'decent jobs' are acceptable—thus ignoring that crucial feature of the 'Asian developmental model' he admires, viz. the generation of what were, initially, low-wage jobs that mopped up unemployment, thereby strengthening the position of labour, and leading to rising incomes in the long run. Of course, South Africa's extreme inequality jars with the acceptance of low wages, but the solution is not, surely, to perpetuate uncompetitiveness by pushing up wage rates, but to confront the problems caused by both the dysfunctional education system and the unduly high salaries and low tax rates of top earners (South Africa's capital gains and inheritance taxes are exceptionally low).

Marais provides a gripping account of the Mbeki/Zuma power struggle, confirming that, in backing Zuma, the political left miscalculated in believing it would secure its economic strategy. It also turned a blind eye to the damage inflicted by both sides during this struggle in corroding the independence of the judiciary and the distinction between party and state. Marais argues that, under Zuma, South African politics have become more open and democratic but also more corrupt, describing the situation as 'a clash between a Weberian state struggling to be born and patrimonial, clientelistic relations that refuse to die' (p. 358).

Marais fears that South Africa could follow the Zimbabwean route, but this possibility is not concentrating minds on the need to overcome historical enmities, and to focus on the

shared interests and values that both the left and liberals have in opposing another round of demagogic racist nationalism in South Africa.

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Oil and insurgency in the Niger Delta: managing the complex politics of petro-violence. Edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. London: Zed Books. 2011. 272pp. Index. Pb.: £21.99. ISBN 978 1 84813 807 0.

Since 2006, the issue of oil-related conflict—or petro-violence—in the Niger Delta has gained increasing prominence on the international energy security agenda. Niger Delta militant activities have been cause for international concern: Michael Watts highlighted the significance of conflict in the Niger Delta in contributing to the volatility of global oil prices (*Review of African Political Economy*, 2007); in 2008 attacks by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) on the Bonga oil facility in the Gulf of Guinea disproved Michael Ross's assertion in 'Oil, drugs and diamonds' (in Jake Sherman and Karen Ballentine, eds, *The political economy of armed grievance*, Lynne Rienner, 2003) that offshore oil is not obstructable; and MEND's 2010 bombings demonstrated that the 2009 amnesty programme has thus far failed. It is against this backdrop that *Oil and insurgency in the Niger Delta* is set—arguing that the failure to resolve the conflict in the Niger Delta is down to a lack of attention to its root causes. Accordingly, the book interrogates the causes of conflict in the region, and is divided into three sections: the first focuses on the grievances underlying the conflict and the implications of the Nigerian state's handling (or lack thereof) of the perceived ill-treatment of the Niger Delta people; the second looks at the complex relations between the various actors in the conflict, and the sometimes paradoxically symbiotic relationship between militias, oil companies and the government; and the final section examines the responses of oil multinational companies (MNCs) to conflict and the consequences of these responses. The chapters are largely prescriptive, offering valuable insights into conflict resolution in the region. The underlying assumption of this volume, as the editors Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad note, is that 'the window of opportunity is still open for radical reforms that can address the root causes of the conflict and brighten prospects for sustainable peace, but that this opening should not be taken for granted' (p. 14).

Of the book's 13 substantive chapters, the majority deal with the causes of the conflict and the state's (in)capacity to mitigate these causes, which constitute the first section of the book. The seven chapters in this section complement each other, with five chapters highlighting impediments to peace: the transition from peaceful protest to violence (Ukiwo Ukoha); the deficits in the government's capacity to contain conflict (Babatunde Ahonsi); issues of resource control (Rhuks Ako); access to justice (Engobo Emeseh); and the continuing paradigm of state-led pacification of conflict (Charles Ukeje). In addition to this, Ibaba Samuel Ibaba contributes a detailed case-study of how these issues affect the ethnic minority identity organization, the Ijaw National Congress, and Kayode Soremekun's chapter evaluates the impact of oil on Nigeria's diplomacy. While all of these chapters provide a valuable contribution to the volume in their own right, two chapters stand out as being particularly worthy of mention. Ahonsi's chapter on capacity-building examines the chronic weakness of Nigerian institutional and human resource capacities in dealing with conflict, and places the long-term strengthening of these two aspects at the heart of conflict resolution in the Delta. Linked to this, Emeseh's chapter looks at the attitudes of inhabitants of the Niger Delta towards oil-related laws and the perception that the legal system is overwhelmingly in favour of the state and oil MNCs. Both Emeseh and Ahonsi call for

radical overhaul of the Nigerian administrative and juridical systems—and radical, deep-reaching reform, rather than quick-fix solutions, are very much advocated in the remaining chapters.

The second section deals with the dynamics of the Delta's conflict actors. While Augustine Ikelegbe examines the 'factors that drive the appropriation of violence as an instrument of popular struggle, and crime' (p. 125), Morten Bøås examines the contradictions between armed insurgencies' opposition and simultaneous attachment to the state. His chapter is perhaps the most outstanding of this section, as he uses a case-study of MEND to argue convincingly that more effort should be put into transforming the rebel militia into a genuine legitimate political force. Nils Duquet's chapter on small arms and light weapons proliferation in the first section of this book is also worth noting, with its compelling arguments for a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration strategy, as are Oluwatoyin Oluwaniyi's assertions that a more gendered approach to peacebuilding is necessary. The book's final section examines oil MNCs, as Uwafiokun Idemudia looks at the problematic nature of corporate social responsibility, and Anna Zalik examines how some interventions have managed to criminalize community protests. Both these chapters are particularly timely given Shell's landmark admission in August 2011 of responsibility for spills in the Niger Delta. Overall, this book provides an excellent insight into the issues of alienation, injustice and accountability that drive conflict in the Niger Delta, calling wisely for a move away from the securitization of militants and towards more open and genuine dialogue between all the parties involved.

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Consuming the Congo: war and conflict minerals in the world's deadliest place.
By Peter Eichstaedt. Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill Books. 2011. 232pp. £16.26. ISBN 978 1 56976 310 0.

By now the Congo wars have consumed up to an estimated 6 million lives, making the country, in Peter Eichstaedt's words, 'the world's deadliest place' since the Second World War. The exploitation of minerals has been inextricably linked to these wars. The question remains of what role minerals continue to play in this conflict: are they a feature or also a cause of it?

Peter Eichstaedt is among those who argue that minerals not only play a crucial role in the continuation of the conflict but are also one of its main causes. He argues that ethnic conflict was a consequence rather than a source of the quest for gold, coltan, tin, charcoal and so on in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). First evidence of the central role of minerals in the war he finds in May 1997, when Joseph Kabila conquered Kinshasa and foreign troops staked out their interests in various parts of the country (p. 112).

Above all, the author is interested in the role of minerals in the eastern Congo, especially since the so-called Goma agreement of January 2008. That agreement was supposed to establish peace between the warring parties in the Kivus, but failed to do so. According to Eichstaedt, '(t)he conflict [in the eastern Congo] masks the extensive and frequently illicit exploitation of mineral wealth in the region' (p. 2). Minerals, he argues, prevented all parties involved in the Goma agreement from actually taking steps towards true peace; he argues that both local militias and the Congolese government prefer a continuation of the war to safeguard their benefits from exploiting the mines. Since 2009, moreover, the government decided to integrate several local rebel groups into the national army, foremost of which is the (Tutsi-dominated) Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), previously

led by the notorious Laurent Nkunda. This created relative tranquillity in the region, but also led the conflicting groups to further stake out their territories. As a result, Eichstaedt writes, CNDP soldiers now control the tin and coltan mines in the Massisi region with the approval of the government. And '(t)his exploitation and deprivation continue under the watchful eyes of a UN force of twenty-thousand-plus soldiers tasked with keeping a peace that does not exist'. To make matters worse, he adds, 'the UN is beginning a withdrawal of forces in mid-2011' (p. 2).

Eichstaedt's book certainly reveals much about the problems and actors involved in what he calls the 'consuming' of the Congo. The volume pays attention, for example, to the social and ecological deprivations linked to the exploitation of minerals. It also addresses the (changing) attitude of the West on the issue and recent attempts to create a system of tracking and tracing 'conflict-free minerals'. Most importantly, the author points to the role of the Congolese government in all this. In so doing, the book is very insightful.

But the book often also reveals more about the overall problems of the (eastern) Congo than about its actual topic, war and conflict minerals. For example, the author extensively points to the gap between the kind of justice longed for in the DRC and that of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He also dedicates an entire chapter to rape. Yet it is not clear how all this relates to 'war and conflict minerals'.

Moreover, the book relies more on a hypothesis than on in-depth, analytical research and interpretation. It is a form of investigative journalism, which, however insightful, starts from the 'suspicion' that there is more behind 'ethnic animosities' (p. 29). Research mainly relies on interviews conducted during travels in 2008 and 2009. Although very interesting to read, most of these interviews do not give clear answers to our understanding of the nature of the relation between war and conflict minerals. Often the respondents speculate; sometimes they give different, if not contradictory answers. Many think that minerals are a cause of the war, others do not, or attribute a different value to them. On page 157, Eichstaedt writes that a respondent prefers to 'ignore' the 'reality' of a connection between war and resources, seemingly revealing more about his own bias than about the respondent's supposed ignorance. Overall, the book is rather eclectic. When it comes to more thorough interpretations of the relationship between war and conflict minerals, Eichstaedt almost exclusively relies on published research by the United Nations; what he adds to that research remains unclear.

Questions might also be placed regarding some of the choices that the author made when collecting material for the book. Why travel to Sudan to do research when a book is on the (eastern) DRC? Parallels can be drawn, but is the situation around the exploitation of minerals in Sudan really comparable with that in the DRC? The author is mainly interested in the 'consuming' of the eastern Congo (Ituri and the two Kivus), yet it might have been worthwhile to consider also the exploitation of minerals in other areas of the country, especially those in the Katanga province. Katanga, in the south-east of the country, is equally rich in minerals (e.g. diamonds, uranium, tin, copper and so on), and these minerals, too, have been exploited during the Congo wars.

The book is a good read. Despite some repetition, Eichstaedt has a very good pen. *Consuming the Congo* is rich in many ways, triggering the reader's curiosity. Yet it also stimulates a desire really to understand the significance of minerals in the ongoing conflict. Unfortunately, Eichstaedt does not fully satisfy that desire.

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South Asia

Does the elephant dance? Contemporary Indian foreign policy. By David M. Malone.

Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2011. 425pp. £25.00. ISBN 978 0 19955 202 3.

As India makes the transition from a regional to a global player, it comes as no surprise that people are trying to understand what its rise portends for the international order. The growing body of scholarship on India is evidence of the curiosity that its rise has generated among observers. In *Does the elephant dance?* David M. Malone uses his first-hand knowledge of diplomacy to provide us with a nuanced account of Indian foreign policy. Besides tracing India's rise in recent years, he assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Indian foreign policy. By doing so, he gives us a sense of what could be expected of India's foreign policy in the coming years.

The book initially introduces India to the reader. We are acquainted with the evolution of India as a political actor over the centuries and the impact that India's interaction with other polities has had on the country. The chapters on India's security challenges and its economy establish the salience of domestic factors in relation to the formulation of its foreign policy. While the chapter on security examines the myriad challenges—political, religious and economic—that India's decision-makers face, the chapter on the economy provides a *tour d'horizon* of what most would agree is the prime mover of the country's enhanced status. The decision to spend some time outlining the domestic and historical context is well considered; not only does it remind the student of Indian foreign policy of the material and ideational constraints within which foreign policy decisions are made, but it also enables the uninitiated to develop an understanding of India before dealing with its foreign policy. The thoughtfully categorized bibliography serves as an excellent resource for those making their initial forays into studying Indian foreign policy.

Having established the context, the subsequent chapters examine India's relationship with its immediate neighbours, and other prominent actors and regions such as China, the United States, East and South-East Asia, and Europe. A notable feature of each chapter is that it traces the evolution of India's relations with the country/region in question from 1947 to the present. As a result, Malone does more than just analyse contemporary Indian foreign policy.

India's engagement with its immediate neighbours and its principled yet pragmatic relationship with West Asian countries elicit a nod of approval from the author. While noting the strengthening of ties between India and the United States, Malone injects a note of caution when he observes that India has yet to make a strong mark outside the policy circles in Washington. To that extent, the Indo-US relationship is very much a work in progress. The author makes a pertinent observation when he notes that China has replaced Pakistan as the new third party in Indo-US relations. Contrary to scholars who subscribe to the 'China threat' thesis, Malone views China as a challenge rather than a threat to India. He provides relevant examples of China's balanced approach towards India in recent times. Malone believes that with economic pragmatism marking the policies of both powers, cooperation rather than conflict between them is likely. While the author's view on this matter is well considered, one needs to remember that both countries at times demonstrate uncomfortably high levels of nationalism—something that could potentially undermine the pragmatic attitude which the author identifies as marking their bilateral relations.

Malone brings his knowledge of multilateral diplomacy to the analysis of Indian foreign policy. He identifies new multilateral groupings like the G20 as emerging sites of power,

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and examines India's performance within them. This is a much needed corrective to the sometimes single-minded focus of Indian foreign policy scholars on the Security Council. As times change, new sites of power emerge and it is incumbent on students to recognize and examine them. While the author notes India's active involvement in multilateral diplomacy, he worries about its 'growing predilection for global governance by oligarchy' (p. 250). He identifies the strident and at times uncompromising position adopted by India in multilateral settings as a drawback. Malone's observation that India's representatives should make friends and not aim at impressing the gallery in the multilateral world is an unusually strong one (p. 17).

One of the notable aspects of the book is that it provides an assessment of Indian foreign policy from the perspective of a non-Indian. Harnessing his extensive diplomatic contacts, Malone incorporates the subjective experiences of his foreign counterparts in their dealings with the Indian establishment. As a result, it gives one a sense of what Indian foreign policy looks like from the 'outside'. Given that perception sometimes matters more than reality, *Does the elephant dance?* serves as a mirror for practitioners of Indian foreign policy.

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Religion, caste and politics in India. By **Christophe Jaffrelot.** London: Hurst. 2010. 802pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 9 38060 704 7.

Christophe Jaffrelot argues that modern Indian politics can be seen as a constellation of four interlocking themes. The steady rise of the lower, discriminated against and historically marginalized castes; the rise of a brand of inflamed Hindu nationalism; growing social and regional inequalities as a result of economic liberalization in the 1990s; and the Indian pretensions to superpower status leading to a reorientation of a pro-US foreign policy constitute the major themes in the book. In the libretto of history that Jaffrelot unfolds, nationalism and westernization led to the imagining of an Indian nation in the nineteenth century. This imagined nation, in turn, has continued to determine the contours of Indian democratic politics after India's independence in 1947. Jaffrelot has been a prolific commentator on Indian politics; this collection of essays brings together writings published elsewhere over 20 years.

Yet while Jaffrelot's essays reflect an admirable engagement with contemporary Indian politics, they have often lacked a greater sensitivity towards historical sociology and history of ideas. This leads to claims that India has become an ethno-democracy under pressure from the Hindu majority, reducing Muslims to the status of second-class citizens. There is very little dispute about the agenda of the Hindu nationalists and their threatening, often violent, model of Hindu consolidation. However, Jaffrelot manages to conflate the ideology, rhetoric and strategy of the Hindu nationalists in an undifferentiated continuum, thus reaching incorrect conclusions. Even contemporary political debates on the question of Hindu nationalism require a longer and deeper genealogy. These cannot be reduced to the search for a Hindu Golden Age, or be explained as reactions to the western intrusion in Indian social and cultural life. In other words, empirical claims, however rigorous, have to be inscribed by a set of normative claims, something that Jaffrelot seems to assume is covered by the charts and tables that generously populate this volume.

A similar pattern emerges when Jaffrelot discusses the question of caste and the assertion of the lower castes, the Dalits. Once again, the essays presented fail to delineate the contingency that has provoked what Jaffrelot calls the 'plebeianization of politics' in India from the question of upper-caste and lower-caste self-images. What castes say, think or do

in India is a historical question, and not merely a subset of the discourse on democratization and voting. Jaffrelot's understanding of caste comes from sources such as Max Weber, Louis Dumont, M. N. Srinivas and Wilhelm Halbfass, whereas studies on caste behaviour and its impact on India society have long questioned, altered and finessed the insights of these sociological pioneers. As in the case of Hindu nationalism, the question of the plebeianization of politics in India requires an examination of periods and contexts while taking into account the processes of rediscovery and reorientation of self-images.

In a certain sense, Jaffrelot's work is infused with a refusal to admit that two major predictions made by social scientists stand severely tested. The first was the proposition that as modernization and industrialization advance, the hold of religion over the lives of men and women would decline. The universal claims of the secularization thesis today are being vigorously questioned or altered to explain the continued salience of religion in many parts of the world, nowhere more so than in India and Asia. The second was the belief, shared by Marxists and liberals alike, that the hold of nationalism would decline with the erosion of ethnic and cultural differences; increase in industrialization, together with increased mobility, communication, and the steady decline in the hold local communities and associations—like caste—have over people, would dismantle national loyalties. Once again, despite industrialization and mobility of people across the world, nationalism and its durability straddle countries and continents, notably in India.

Indian politics, therefore, will have to be studied in a way, which is, to quote the author's compatriot Foucault, genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. A closer examination of Indian intellectual traditions could be a starting point. This holds good even in the study of India's foreign policy, something that Jaffrelot's volume devotes considerable space to yet reduces to a simple 'action' and 'reaction' matrix. This is surprising, especially after the publication of theoretically sound and culturally nuanced studies on foreign policy like that of Tobias F. Engelmeier, to name just one such contribution. For all this there would be scope in the work if Jaffrelot looked beyond simple causality and easy determinism.

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Secularizing Islamists? Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-ud-Da'wa in urban Pakistan. By Humeira Iqtidar. Chicago, IL, and London: Chicago University Press. 2011. 216pp. Index. £26.00. ISBN 978 0 22638 468 9.

In a pointed exchange from *Alice in wonderland* that serves as a warning to those who seek to dilute the integrity of words and their meaning, Humpty Dumpty informs Alice that, 'When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less', leaving Alice to wonder 'whether you *can* make words mean so many different things' without inviting anarchy. Readers of this slim volume by Humeira Iqtidar, which projects two of Pakistan's most prominent Islamist organizations—Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-ud-Da'wa (the first a political party, the second a charity front for the outlawed militant group, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba)—as 'agents of secularization', may well want to pose the same question as Alice.

For what awaits them here is a definition of the concepts of 'secularization', 'agency' and 'democratic debate' that appear to alter their meaning significantly. 'Secularization' is reinterpreted as the pursuit of 'rationalized' religion in the public sphere; 'agency' recast as an aspect of personal subordination to divine will; and 'democratic debate' reintegrated as a hallmark of Islamism. Together they promise to illuminate the complex world of Islamism

in Pakistan while offering readers the chance to master current theoretical debates centring on the intricate relationship between the ideology of secularism and the process of secularization. With a wealth of ethnographic detail to enrich the analysis, expectations of a path-breaking study would have been well founded.

Yet the book disappoints. Its limitations stem neither from the author's lack of dedication to her subject nor from her insufficiently engaging with her many interlocutors. Rather, its weaknesses flow from an approach that is less concerned with understanding Pakistan in the light of its own history than with contributing to an intellectual endeavour aimed at shoring up a discourse of resistance against 'the West' and its attendant evils—in this case, secularism. Indeed, the discipline of choice used to drive this project is not history, but anthropology, and it comes as no surprise that its acknowledged high priest, the US-based academic, Talal Asad, should also be an anthropologist. His work is actively championed by acolytes keen to challenge what one of his more ardent followers, the anthropologist Saba Mahmood, has described as a western-led 'secular-liberal inquisition'. Iqtidar, a political scientist clearly in thrall to anthropology, makes no secret of her debt to Asad or his definition of secularism as the 'continuous management of religious thought and practice by the [nation] state', whose Christian roots now posturing as 'universal' qualify it for outright rejection.

However, the promotion of this agenda would have mattered little had it not contributed to some serious historical lapses that mar Iqtidar's analysis. For while she devotes considerable space to addressing the 'creative tension' between secularism and Islamism in colonial India, she seems oblivious to the strength of Islamist forces in the immediate aftermath of the creation of Pakistan—a curious oversight given the robust Islamist presence in constitutional debates over Pakistan's Islamic identity in the early years. Her cursory treatment of Islamism in the 1950s, especially the momentum gained by Islamism in the wake of the anti-Ahmedi movement in this period, also risks fostering the impression that Islamism in Pakistan is a relatively recent phenomenon dating back to the late 1960s and 1970s when, we are led to believe, after a titanic battle with the political left, Islamist groups emerged victorious as the beneficiaries of a vast US-led, foreign-financed war in neighbouring Afghanistan. The problem with this analysis is not only that it exaggerates the role of the political left—always a bit player on Pakistan's national political scene—but that it falls prey to the dubious hypothesis that Islamism in Pakistan is primarily foreign, i.e. western-inspired, rather than rooted in the founding ideology of a state plagued by its uncertain relation to Islam.

But it is Iqtidar's portrayal of the Jama'at-e-Islami and the Jama'at-ud-Da'wa as engines of secularization that is likely to leave most readers mystified. For intrinsic to her argument is the claim that Pakistan's Islamists, by 'rationalizing' religion, are, albeit inadvertently, promoting 'social and political secularization'. The importance attached by Islamists to the individual's direct, rather than mediated, relationship with God, their rejection of traditional religious authority as constitutive of agency, and their endorsement of open debate on questions of belief and practice are all taken by Iqtidar to be evidence of Islamist engagement in a 'process of secularization'. But this engagement, she emphasizes, must not be seen to be subscribing to the 'project of secularism', which Iqtidar (in concert with Asad) regards as a western-driven, Christian-inspired ideology. What follows is the suggestion that, while it behoves Islamists (and Muslim societies like Pakistan) to reject secularism as culturally alien, they remain open to secularization—a process judged by Iqtidar to be more 'universal' than secularism and untainted by any association with the 'Christian West'.

This argument raises troubling questions. Not the least worrying is whether a political agenda—namely, 'Muslim resistance' to the 'Christian West'—can drive an intellectual

exercise such as this without inflicting the kind of damage to the integrity of concepts like 'secularism' and 'secularization' for which a politically dominant western discourse has hitherto been held responsible. But more importantly, it raises questions about whether Iqtidar's 'theory of secularization' is at all borne out by the trajectory of Islamism in Pakistan. Can the frenzied reaction of the Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-ud-Da'wa against plans to reform Pakistan's punitive Islamic laws (the Hudood Ordinances) or repeal its discriminatory blasphemy laws (neither of which receive attention here) really encourage the 'rationalization' of religion? How credible is the idea of agency articulated by groups like the Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-ud-Da'wa, whose willing subservience to the military makes a mockery of their claim to resist authority? And what real meaning can we attach to the 'questioning, debate and contrasting opinions regarding religious belief and practice' Iqtidar associates with Islamists in a society where Islamists connive daily to strangle all scope for religious dissent?

These and other questions need more careful scrutiny if this account of Pakistani Islamism is not to be dismissed as fanciful. For much as fantasy would afford some much needed respite from the grim reality confronting its people today, Pakistan, alas, is no *Wonderland*.

Farzana Shaikh, *Asia Programme, Chatham House*

The wrong war: grit, strategy, and the way out of Afghanistan. By Bing West. New York: Random House, 2011. 307pp. Index. ISBN 978 1 40006 873 9.

The wrong war betrays the frustrations of an author familiar with the field; in this case with the dirt. The promotional material and dust jacket make much of Bing West's experience: as a veteran soldier, sceptical journalist, tactical and operational adviser and ultimately strategic thinker. As one promotional blurb puts it: 'This is not think-tank theorizing, it's the real shit from a career warrior and first-rate military thinker'. West served in combat and has experienced war as a veteran analyst, and he also served as Reagan's Assistant Secretary of Defense. He is the author of numerous books, one a 'classic' on the Marine Corps curriculum, and several others on Iraq. His work has appeared in the most prominent papers and journals. There is a Beckettian condition to the dilemma that the thesis of *The wrong war* advances: 'America cannot afford to lose the war in Afghanistan, and yet Americans cannot win it', the sleeve reveals. They cannot go and they cannot stay at the strategic level. At the tactical level, many of the operations, West suggests, resemble the toil of Sisyphus.

Between the sleeves there is a long slog from the introduction to the penultimate chapter. The first few lines and pages set the tone: '[A particular Sergeant], twenty-three, lay behind a dirt mound as rounds cracked overhead. His binoculars were fixed on a concrete mosque with arched windows on the far side of a poppy field. A young man in a grey burka was peeking out of the mosque'. The language is laden with semiotic allusion. The narrative is filled with an admiring sequence of observations on the daily experiences of various units and men. The fire fights described in the book, we are told, are posted on YouTube. The chapters follow the units through their engagements with endless detail, the maps, the weapons, the terrain, the company and the men. The book is rich with dialogue and observation from the ground—the dirt. The author is closely connected and empathetic to the US protagonists. On the other hand, the Taleban is not quite 'orientalized'; West recognizes the diversity of command and motivation, pointing out that some analysts 'called them "anti-coalition militias", indicating that anti-infidel or anti-foreigner sentiment is at the core of the insurgency'. Yet beyond the recognition of this diversity, the book provides

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a very light approach to analysing the opposing forces, beyond their tactical proclivities. This work is focused on the US experience on the ground and most others—the European ‘allies’, the government in Kabul and the politicians in Washington—are excoriated. The formula is old; the setting new, the frustration palpable. West concludes the first section of the book on the ‘North’: ‘In ten years of warfare, the U.S. military had not designed a set of offensive tactics to keep the insurgents in the mountains off balance. Nor had the U.S. senior staffs come up with a counter to Taliban attacks from its sanctuary’, Pakistan.

By far the most interesting section of the work is the final chapter on ‘The way out’. It is with relief that one arrives at this stage, but the message is no more positive. If the United States cannot win and cannot leave—the Taleban would likely win a civil war, Al-Qaeda would be invigorated, a nuclear-armed Pakistan could be destabilized further, and withdrawal would ‘shake global confidence in America’—then West proposes a middle ground that avoids the futile engagement hitherto considered. Negotiations do not provide the solution because they, according to West, ‘ratify strength on the battlefield’. The book is frustrating to the extent that it is frequently filled with the confidence of this kind of assertion without consideration of the intricacies that might be possible. Instead, the way out rests on a partial draw-down from 100,000 to 50,000 troops. Given the years of inconclusive engagement, the dispersion of Al-Qaeda and the subsequent focus on democratization and nation-building, as well as the attendant costs, West concludes that the US mission should change. It cannot afford the expense of Afghanistan; the engagement has been largely unrewarding; its relationship with Karzai and Kabul ambiguous at the least. The US should remain as advisers and transition away from the failing missions that it cannot sustain and which cost too much. Its role should be confined to advice, limited engagement and infusing the Afghan forces with ‘a winning spirit’. Ultimately, echoing General Mark Clark at the end of the Korean War in 1953, West concludes ‘we have fought the wrong war with the wrong strategy’. Clark also added: against the wrong enemy.

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East Asia and Pacific

Where China meets India: Burma and the new crossroads of Asia. By **Thant Myint-U**. London and New York: Faber and Faber. 2011. 358pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 0 57123 963 4.

This is the third book by the scholar and diplomat Thant Myint-U. Like its predecessors, *Where China meets India* is substantial, well-written and coherently argued. It continues the author’s trajectory away from the academic historian of the brilliant *The making of modern Burma* (Cambridge University Press, 2000) to the more popular and relaxed style of *The river of lost footsteps* (Faber and Faber, 2007). Like his last book, the new volume is pitched at the general reader, combining elements of biography with longer passages of historical and contemporary descriptive reportage. Despite its non-academic approach, the book is clearly well researched and Thant delivers a good deal of information along the way (although this reviewer would have preferred a more user-friendly referencing system).

As its title suggests, *Where China meets India* differs from its predecessors in the scope of its coverage and ambitions. The previous two books focused on the history of Burma (or Myanmar), drawing original and important conclusions, with implications for our understanding of recent and contemporary politics in this beautiful but troubled country. Here, the focus lies also on Burma, but the author seeks to connect his home country to the

larger geopolitical region. He thus corrects an imbalance in much of the scholarly, policy-orientated and popular literature regarding Burma, which tends to be rather parochial, rarely connecting Burmese society, politics or economy to those of neighbouring countries.

Thant examines the implications for Burma and the region of the rise of China and India. He makes a number of excellent points regarding the manner in which these emerging powers are reconfiguring basic realities in Burma—and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. He traces the history of regional interlinkages, from pre-colonial times, through nineteenth-century colonial dreams of finding a ‘back passage’ to China, to the present day. The book is particularly interesting in its analysis of Chinese and (to a lesser extent) Indian strategic thinking in relation to Burma. For China especially, the ‘golden land’ represents a land bridge to the Indian Ocean. Plans are well under way to develop road and rail links from China through Burma to the sea. These projects will allow China to project its strategic power to the south-west, and to access oil and other imports from the Middle East, without having to transit goods on the much longer passage through the strategically vulnerable Malacca Straits.

As Thant observes, a 700-mile-radius circle around Burma’s second city of Mandalay would encompass some 600 million people. Although relatively isolated from key events of the twentieth century, this region is set to become of great strategic importance. Thant convincingly argues that western governments’ imposition of sanctions on Burma has had little impact in terms of promoting regime change. However, sanctions have driven the Burmese military government into the Chinese (and to a lesser degree Indian) sphere of strategic influence.

This is an important book. However, the main ideas could have been expressed in less than 300-plus pages. Much of the additional material consists of diversions into the history of the lands that have become southern China and north-east India, as well as accounts of Thant’s travels in the region. Some of this travelogue could probably have been reduced, without undermining the book’s impact. Fortunately, however, Thant writes well. Therefore, among its other values, his new book should prove a useful companion to travels in these previously little-explored new crossroads of Asia.

Ashley South

China in 2020: a new type of superpower. By **Hu Angang**. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2011. 213pp. Index. £27.99. ISBN 978 0 81570 478 2.

With the long-lasting debate over whether China has developed into a Great Power having been settled in recent years, the next question increasingly being asked is whether the country will achieve superpower status, and if so, what type of foreign policy it will develop. Signs of growing Chinese power have multiplied since the onset of the post-2008 global recession, with China now widely predicted to reach American gross domestic product levels in the year forming the title of this book. The question of China’s international behaviour, as it reaches such lofty levels of global power status, has therefore taken on much new urgency.

China in 2020 is written by a professional scholar of Chinese power in the international system, and benefits further from introductory pieces from two other specialists in this field, John Thornton and Cheng Li, which provide extensive background on the question of China’s rise as well as an examination of previous studies. As Cheng writes in his introduction, this book is about two noteworthy themes, ‘Chinese optimism and Chinese exceptionalism’ (p. xviii). Hu does not downplay the fact that China’s growth and rise in power

has been a remarkable and accelerated development. However, with this book he seeks to describe the concept of a Chinese superpower as a state that will become more conservative, cooperative and in a position to provide lessons to other parts of the world, rather than employing hard power to get what it wants. For example, early in the work the author takes exception to the oft-studied concept of a 'Beijing consensus', a Chinese model of development, which stands in contrast to the American-led neo-liberalist approach. 'The expression *Beijing consensus* implies that China is imposing its will on others. If anything, it should be called a *Beijing proposal*' (p. 17, italics in original).

The opening sections of the book provide a brief but informative explanation of China's post-1978 economic growth and the sources of its success, including the difficult move away from traditional agriculture and the expansion and diversification of the manufacturing sectors. At the same time, however, the book explains that such growth has introduced issues of health, the environment and demography, such as an ageing workforce accompanied by a potentially large proportion of retirees, problems exacerbated by a drop in the birth rate and a still-incomplete state-level welfare system. The chapter on demographics also explains the problem of rapid urbanization as a result of the flight to the cities in the wake of expanded economic opportunities there. With the urbanization rate in China, according to the book, scheduled to reach 71 per cent in 2030, up from 47 per cent in 2010, issues such as improved infrastructure and services as well as a weakened household registration system, which originally discouraged internal migration, are also growing in importance. As for the environment, the book explains that China is not immune from the potential effects of climate change, partially brought on by the side-effects of Chinese development, and that the country faces stark choices in the near future about the need for changes: 'a change from "black" development to "green" development, a change from depleting nature to harmonious coexistence with nature, and a change from ecological deficit to ecological surplus' (p. 121). Despite all of these challenges, *China in 2020* expresses hope that the Chinese government will be able to overcome these obstacles to Great Power status.

Critics may argue that the optimistic tone of the book glosses over other issues related to Chinese politics, including the role of the military and Chinese grand strategy, as well as relations with the United States and other large powers. While this book does not purport to be a complete portrait of Chinese politics or international affairs in the coming decade, it does make very well-reasoned arguments that China's development into a superpower need not come about at the expense of international peace and order, and it provides much new material for debate on the future identity of China.

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From Mao to market: China reconfigured. By Robin Porter. London: Hurst. 2011. 288pp. Index. Pb.: £15.95. ISBN 978 1 84904 083 9.

'Reconfigured' may be too mild a term to describe the political and social changes which have taken place in China since the reform movement of the late 1970s. One could argue that summarizing these changes has become too complex a task to be contained in a single volume, but this work nonetheless successfully tackles this challenge. The result is a concise overview of current Chinese political history, which examines how and why the country has modernized as it has. The work reaches back to periods well before the Maoist era to explain how historical traditions within China have shaped today's politics. Students of (and newcomers to) Chinese political studies will find this work a very useful reference, and more experienced China scholars will also find much to appreciate here.

The first four chapters detail critical events in Chinese history, starting with pivotal events during the dynastic eras. These events, it is argued, were responsible for shaping much of modern Chinese political thinking. After detailing the Maoist and post-Maoist eras in the country, the book then goes into more specific questions regarding the role of political thinking in modern China, starting with the ideas of Confucianism. These philosophies were challenged when China was opened up to the West in the nineteenth century, and harshly considered during much of the Maoist period, only to be enthusiastically revived by the current Chinese government as the country's interests became more internationalized and Beijing sought to develop a more congenial global reputation. Confucianism is described not only in traditional terms, including the value of the family, education and commerce, but also in terms of how it melds with the 'orthodoxy' of more recent Chinese political thinking and the relationship between government and people. 'Marxism was, in the way it was presented by the Communist Party to the people of China, the one great new source of universal truth, and modern scientific equivalent of the divine sanction of old' (p. 108). The argument is therefore that although much of what would become the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was imported from outside actors, much of its ideological structure was a continuation of previous political and social thinking within China itself.

One aspect of China's political development not commonly covered in other literature on the subject has been the role of technology. At first glance, the omission is understandable given the extent of Chinese underdevelopment throughout much of the first few decades of the People's Republic. However, the role of technology is portrayed here as a variable which the CCP both mistrusted and commonly attempted to channel, often for political rather than economic gain. With the exception of Soviet imports, technological development under Mao is described as heavily constrained until his death and conversely, the opening to outside know-how under Deng Xiaoping. Today, the book asserts, technological innovation is (micro)managed by the Ministry of Science and Technology and is still under much political oversight, a potential shortcoming, which is becoming more obvious in the light of questions over when, not whether, China will become the world's largest economy in a decade or so.

The remainder of the book returns to the question of the roles and legitimacy of the CCP in the current era of modernization. Although the Party today is not considered to be the monolith which it often appeared to be under Mao, it is described here as decentralizing very reluctantly and remaining very concerned about political reform spinning out of central control. 'If there were to be any serious political challenge to the centre, it is entirely possible that many within the Party would seek a remedy consistent with its centralist, Leninist roots' (p. 164). The book concludes with a reasoned discussion of the thorny matter of whether these changes to Chinese politics will encourage the advent of the 'fifth modernization', democracy. While this book does not purport to have all the answers to these and other questions related to China's future political directions, it does provide a fresh and absorbing look at the major issues facing the country as it struggles with the more advanced stages of its reform.

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Latin America and Caribbean

The rise of Evo Morales and the MAS. By **Sven Harten**. London: Zed Books. 2011. 262pp. Index. Pb.: £18.99. ISBN 978 1 84813 524 6.

From rebellion to reform in Bolivia: class struggle, indigenous liberation, and the politics of Evo Morales. By **Jeffery R. Webber**. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books. 2011. 281pp. Index. Pb.: £14.99. ISBN 978 1 60846 106 6.

Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia: the first term in context, 2006–2010. Edited by **Adrian J. Pearce**. London: Institute for the Study of the Americas. 2011. 239pp. Index. Pb.: £15.00. ISBN 978 1 90003 999 4.

In the same manner that the Cuban revolution provided the essential stimulus for the growth of Latin American studies as an academic discipline, the coming to power of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and of Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism, MAS) in Bolivia has led to a veritable outpouring of scholarly (and not so scholarly) work—as well as a similarly inflamed political debate—on these two countries. In the case of Bolivia, there is the additional factor of Morales's election in December 2005 as the first indigenous president of a country with an indigenous majority having been invested with a symbolism comparable to the election of Nelson Mandela as president of South Africa in 1994.

The three books under review represent a sampling of the range and variable quality of current scholarship on contemporary Bolivia. They also attest to the strength of Bolivian studies in the United Kingdom as well as to the tight-knit nature of the community of 'Bolivianists': Sven Harten completed the doctoral dissertation upon which both his chapter and book are based, at the London School of Economics; Jeffery Webber, a Canadian, is currently ensconced at Queen Mary, University of London, alongside James Dunkerley—arguably the doyen in the field—a contributor to the Pearce volume; John Crabtree, also a contributor, endorses Harten's book on the back cover and was co-editor of a significant volume of papers initially presented at a conference at Nuffield College, Oxford (*Unresolved tensions: Bolivia past and present*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008); and a further contributor, Argentine journalist Martín Sivak, most recently author of an intimate portrait of Morales (*Evo Morales: the extraordinary rise of the first indigenous president of Bolivia*, Palgrave, 2010, reviewed in *International Affairs* 87: 1), had his MA thesis on regional conflict in Bolivia supervised by Dunkerley.

The two single-author works present starkly different portraits of the MAS and its political project. Despite adopting the name of a defunct political party for purposes of electoral registration, Harten argues that the MAS was never a socialist party but one dedicated to a more democratic refounding of Bolivia, which would embrace the previously excluded indigenous majority. He judges the decision to open party lists in 2004 (and again in 2009 to former members of 'traditional' parties) as of vital importance to the achievement of electoral success, though it came at the price of diluting the influence of the party's original core constituency in the coca growers' movement, and at the risk of the entrance into the party of political opportunists (the reason the party did not always fare so well in local elections). Webber, in contrast, contends that, like the ANC in South Africa, the MAS has stalled—'stalled', since he still sees glimmers of hope—an incipient project of socialist transformation; this was heralded in Bolivia by the 'revolutionary' ferment of the years 2000 to 2005 which witnessed, inter alia, the Cochabamba 'water war' of 2000, which

saw the reversal of a major neo-liberal privatization measure, and the 'gas wars' of 2003 and 2005, which led to the fall of two presidential incumbents. To Webber, it was the influx of *mestizo* intellectuals (personified by current Vice-President Álvaro García Linera) into the party after the unexpectedly strong showing in the 2002 elections that led to the transformation of the MAS into a reformist party bent on the achievement of a 're-constituted neo-liberalism'—due to the class interest that it serves. Much of his book is taken up with an unabashed Marxist critique of the MAS government for its 'new' reformist course; for failing even to reduce appreciably the acute levels of poverty among indigenous people at a time of high national income from gas exports; and for allowing the 're-articulation of rightwing forces'. The words 'fascist' and 'racist' are used quite freely to describe elements of the opposition in the autonomy-seeking departments of eastern Bolivia (the so-called Media Luna), who agitated violently against elements of the proposed constitution. Harten, while broadly sympathetic to the reformist aims of the party, advances a much more tempered critique of Morales and the MAS: for instance, over the deceptive notion of consensus at work within the party; the filling of offices with the party's supporters; the exceeding complexity of the constitution that was eventually produced, with many textual ambiguities and the challenges that will be posed in drawing up secondary implementing legislation; and the over-representation of smaller indigenous groups.

A more detached and empirically rich contribution to an understanding of Bolivian developments is to be found in the volume edited by Adrian Pearce; it is also, symptomatically, the only one of the three works to provide a map for ready reference. Herbert Klein offers a succinct and useful analysis of the underlying changes under way in Bolivian society since the 1952 revolution, without which recent events cannot be comprehended. Sven Harten's chapter presents a preliminary version of some of the main findings of his subsequent book, though his text is occasionally burdened (more so than in his book) by some rather opaque phraseology. The chapter by Willem Assies helpfully places the 2009 constitution within the context of previous efforts at constitutional change. John Crabtree, in the most rewarding chapter of the collection, proffers a typically straightforward and level-headed analysis of the factors behind the MAS's rise to electoral predominance in just over a decade. On the economy under the MAS government, he takes a less dismissive approach than Webber: while conceding that the model of export-led growth has continued and that poverty alleviation has been minimal since 2006, 'the data available ... suggests that poverty rates have fallen, as has the degree of inequality in Bolivian society' (p. 138), thus accounting in part for continued support from poorer elements of the electorate. Martín Sivak addresses the important transformation in the nature of the US–Bolivian relationship under Morales; apart from some swipes by Webber at the machinations of 'imperialism' and a remark about the sagacity of Morales's decision during his first year in office to align Bolivia more closely with Cuba and Venezuela, Sivak's chapter constitutes the only substantive discussion in any of the books of Bolivia in an international context. James Dunkerley's contribution, in the form of a diary, makes a number of interesting points but some of his references might not be altogether understandable to other than fellow Bolivianists with long time-horizons.

None of the books provide a fully rounded picture of the momentous and transformative changes that have brought Bolivia to unwonted international attention over the last decade. Harten, in a study based on interviews and participant observation, is primarily concerned with the internal transformation of the MAS and the prospects for further institutionalization. Webber appears overly mesmerized by the revolutionary conjuncture, a subject that he dwells on at great length in his concurrent opus *Left-indigenous struggles in*

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modern Bolivia (Brill, 2011). The Pearce compilation suffers from the same lacunae that beset all such multi-authored works. In general, insufficient background material is presented for an adequate understanding of the terminal crisis of the preceding neo-liberal order. Nor is there any attempt at a detailed and impartial analysis of the factors motivating the opposition in the Media Luna departments; notwithstanding his class-informed rhetoric, Webber offers the most informative account of the confrontations of 2008, which many observers at the time predicted would lead either to secession or to civil war. The Harten and Webber books, in addition, presuppose a degree of intimacy by the reader with the nature of Bolivian politics. Regardless of these limitations, all three books contribute significantly—if sometimes contentiously—to a better understanding of certain aspects of what has recently transpired in Bolivia.

Philip Chrimes

Latin America and global capitalism: a critical globalization perspective. By **William I. Robinson.** Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 2008. 412pp. Index. £29.50. ISBN 978 0 80189 039 0.

William I. Robinson is always a provocative and worthwhile read for those interested in the political economy of Latin America as well as processes of globalization. The book under review is a further development of the critical globalization perspective he has set out in a series of previous works, although in some ways this book feels less finished and coherent than his earlier books. Rather than being a shortcoming, this reflects his efforts to grapple with the contradictions in the global capitalist model that were only just becoming clear when the volume went to press in 2008, presaging many of the challenges currently facing the G20. The central hypothesis guiding Robinson's analysis is that the current model of capitalist accumulation is nearing the end of its easy phase. Without access to new pools of cheap labour and expanding markets to ensure continued growth in consumption, he argues, the model of wealth generation that marked the latter half of the twentieth century will collapse. This presents a considerable challenge for Latin America.

One of the more endearing aspects of this book is that it makes clear that Latin America is not necessarily subservient to global capitalism. Detailed case-studies on economic sectors such as tourism, the cut flower industry and Andean ethnic weavings illustrate that regional elites are more than capable of entering and succeeding in the global market. More to the point, Robinson makes evident that this is not as unusual as we might at first think. Indeed, it is advanced as something we should expect if we turn our attention to the transnationalized nature of the capitalist class. While ably presented and clearly articulated, these ideas are not particularly new, even if they have been forgotten and were not all that forcefully present in the past. In the 1960s Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto mapped out this very process, albeit without any particularly compelling examples of 'multilatinas'. What Robinson does very usefully is to extend the argument by explaining how a single global pool of labour has formed to feed the needs of global capital.

The subordinate position of labour in Robinson's analysis perhaps slightly blurs his clear sense of Latin America retaining a sense of agency, especially in the section discussing new versions of US military penetration of the region. Notions of competing Brazilian attempts to run the region are sidelined in an effort to establish the United States as regional chief. Similar short shrift is given to internal Colombian political processes that prompt the country to drive the security relationship with the United States, rather than the other way around. While there is a clear Gramscian argument that this is simply a manifestation of

the depth of US hegemony, the point is contestable and needed to be addressed more forcefully. Similarly dissatisfying is the treatment of the revolutionary nature of the popular regimes in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. As the recent cancer scare of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela made clear, there remains an excessive centralization of power, which severely undercuts suggestions of new models of politics. Of course, these questions are still the subject of a very vibrant debate, and Robinson's treatment of them is a useful contribution. The difficult line which Robinson treads with a high degree of success is that between grappling with the empirical reality on the ground and the propositions suggested by his robust theoretical model.

In the end Robinson directly tackles the crucial problem often skirted by critics of the neo-liberal model of globalization, asking if there is a viable alternative project and if so, what it is. His answers do not bring a great deal of hope, stumbling over an unwillingness to consider globalized regulatory structures with teeth that transcend the strictures of sovereignty. This leads to a brief concluding section setting out four possible future scenarios for the global system, none of which appear particularly appealing. The final sense from this book is that the global system has hit a moment of serious crisis. Hopefully, Robinson will follow this book up with work looking at what has changed now that the centre appears dependent on the periphery for rescue.

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Latin American foreign policies: between ideology and pragmatism. Edited by **Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert.** New York: Palgrave. 2011. 272pp. Index. £55.00. ISBN 978 0 23011 095 3.

The editors of this volume are not shy about their hope that it will establish itself as 'the reference book' for the study of Latin American foreign policies during the first decade of the twenty-first century, a period that witnessed a marked shift to the political left across the region: their 'aim is to characterize and define a period, and establish the key areas for debate and research' (p. 8). In this, they have had somewhat mixed success.

Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert contend that, to an extent qualitatively different from the past, the new administrations on the political left—as well as others on the right—have consciously adopted, to varying degrees, a combination of ideology and pragmatism 'carefully and purposefully calculated and adjusted depending on the audience, the venue and the circumstance' (p. 255) to achieve their foreign policy goals in an emerging multipolar international environment marked by a profound questioning of globalization and US economic and political dominance. This has allowed, for example, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela to construct his anti-hegemonic Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), while continuing to depend for revenue on oil sales to the United States; Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua to join ALBA at the same time as adhering to a previously concluded regional free trade treaty with the United States; and Lula's Brazil simultaneously to advocate for the global South while seeking access to the ranks of the Great Powers. Ideology at a rhetorical level, largely addressed at a domestic constituency, has been frequently eclipsed by pragmatism in the actual practice of diplomacy.

The case-studies have been developed within a common analytical framework that identifies ends and purposes, the means available, agency, process and structure as the principal factors influencing the relative weighting of ideology or pragmatism in a given country's foreign policy. The selection of case-studies—the region's major foreign policy players as well as Paraguay, Bolivia and Nicaragua—has been made on account of 'their

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significance to the theoretical model and conceptual tools adopted ... both in terms of support for and challenges to' the theoretical argument (p. 2). Owing to space constraints and the felt need in some cases to explain more of the historical background, there is considerable variance in the ability of some of the contributors to sketch more than the barest outlines of a country's new foreign policy direction. At a bare twelve pages, the chapter on Brazil is, for example, simply too brief to convey adequately the complexity of the foreign policy of an emerging global player under two distinctive administrations between 1995 and 2010; this may be compared to, say, the chapter on Paraguay (at 17 pages), which manages to present a far more detailed picture of an albeit less prominent foreign policy actor. The chapters on Cuba and Nicaragua take the period since the 1959 and 1979 revolutions, respectively, as their overall framework, at the cost of a somewhat cursory treatment of the contemporary period, whereas the case-study on Mexico focuses on the foreign policy of the two Partido Acción Nacional governments since 2000 to more beneficial effect. All the case-studies are, nonetheless, of a generally high analytical quality and stay firmly anchored to their theoretical remit.

For a volume with the aspiration to be regarded as a future work of reference on the subject, it is regrettable that it should be marred by some rather slipshod copy-editing: the full name of President Lula of Brazil is rendered in several different ways by various contributors; the aforementioned ALBA is referred to both by the version prior to and after the formal name change on 24 June 2009 without explanation, and in one instance the 'B' is taken to stand for 'Bolivian', not 'Bolivarian' (p. 133); different authors provide dissimilar lists of ALBA membership; one member, Saint Vincent, is referred to as San Vicente (p. 239); and the acronym URUPABOL becomes UPRABOL further down the same page (p. 80). In short, a book such as this calls out for the provision of a glossary. There are sundry other minor errors in the same vein. The book lacks consistency also in the use of accents, even from paragraph to paragraph within the same chapter in one case (that of Peru). There are also a few factual errors: for instance, Peter Lambert's claim (p. 75) that Nicanor Duarte was the first Paraguayan president to have been received in the White House (in 2005) overlooks the reception by FDR of President Higinio Moríñigo on 9 June 1943; he also refers misleadingly in the next line to Donald Rumsfeld as 'secretary of state'; and Chávez was first elected in December 1998, not 'early 1998', as another author has it (p. 127).

Overall, the volume represents a handy interpretative survey of the new direction that the foreign policy of numerous Latin American countries has taken over the last decade. Those readers with a prior acquaintance with the subject will derive the most benefit from it.

Philip Chrimes